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1. Introduction 
In the  United  States,  it has  long  been  the  practice  of  central  bankers 
to meet  periodically  with  outside  consultants,  including  academic  and 
business  economists,  in order to discuss  the current economic  situation. 
In the authors' experience  as invited  consultants,  these  meetings  invari- 
ably end  with  a "go-round,"  in which  each consultant  is asked  to give 
his  or her  views  on  current  monetary  policy.  Often  the  go-round  is 
prefaced by a question  of the following  sort: "The Federal Open  Market 
Committee  [the group that determines  U.S.  monetary policy] meets next 
Tuesday.  What actions  do you  recommend  that we  take?" 
We have  each  found  it quite  difficult  to  give  a good  answer  to  this 
type  of question,  not  only  because,  as ivory-tower  academics,  we  tend 
to  have  a less-detailed  knowledge  of  current  conditions  than  do  the 
central bankers.  The larger problem  is that the  question  lacks context: 
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Implicitly,  it asks  for advice  on  tactics without  specifying  the  strategy. 
Probably the most  enduring  lesson  of Lucas's (1976) famous  critique is 
that the effects of any given  policy action depend  greatly on the expecta- 
tions it engenders:  Is the policy intended  to be temporary or permanent? 
Under what circumstances  will it be changed?  Expectations about policy 
in  turn  depend  on  the  public's  perceptions  of  the  authorities'  policy 
strategy,  as  determined  both  by  policymakers'  explicit  choices  and  by 
deeper  political  and institutional  factors.  Thus,  if we  hope  ever to give 
a really satisfactory  answer  to  the  central banker's  question,  we  must 
first develop  some  clear views  about  monetary  policy  strategy  as well 
as tactics. These  concerns  motivate  our paper. 
What is the  optimal  strategy  for the  monetary  authorities  to follow? 
There  is  a  large  and  venerable  academic  literature  on  this  question, 
which  has  tended  to  cast  the  central  banker's  options  rather  starkly 
as following  either  rules or discretion. A monetary  rule specifies  future 
monetary  actions  as a simple function  of economic  or monetary  condi- 
tions1; at least  in principle,  monetary  rules  do  not  allow  the  monetary 
authorities  to respond  to unforeseen  circumstances.  Examples  of rules 
are Milton Friedman's k% money  growth  rule and (strict) nominal  GNP 
targeting.  Fischer  (1990)  describes  the  rationales  that  have  been  ad- 
vanced  for rules: The most  compelling  is probably  Kydland  and  Pres- 
cott's  (1977) argument  that  rules  increase  the  central bank's  ability  to 
precommit  to  avoiding  monetary  surprises,  which  in  turn  permits  a 
lower  steady-state  rate of inflation. 
In contrast  to rules,  the  strategy  of discretion2 puts  no  prior restric- 
tions  on  the  actions  that  the  central  bank  can  take  at each  date.  The 
basic rationale for discretion,  as discussed  by Fischer (1990), is that the 
benefit of allowing  the central bank to respond  flexibly to unanticipated 
contingencies  is  greater  than  any  advantage  gained  from  precom- 
mitment. 
The  debate  about  rules  and  discretion,  although  motivated  by  real 
policy  concerns  and  some  (mostly  U.S.)  experience,  has  been  cast 
largely  in  abstract and  ahistorical  terms.  An  alternative,  and  comple- 
mentary,  research strategy is simply  to observe  what  central bankers at 
different  places  and  times  have  actually  done,  and  to see  what  results 
they have obtained.  This more flatly empirical approach is taken by the 
1. The requirement  of simplicity  is essential. Any monetary  strategy  at all could in princi- 
ple be specified as a sufficiently  complex contingent rule. 
2. In what sense is discretion a strategy, rather than the absence of a strategy?  If we 
interpret  discretion  as the best time-consistent  (no-precommitment)  policy, then it is a 
strategy  in the formal  sense, because in principle,  one could calculate  the policy action 
to be taken in every future  contingency. In practice,  of course, such a calculation  would 
be difficult  or impossible  to carry  out, so that the strategy  implied  by discretion  is much 
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present  paper.  We  use  a  simple  case  study  methodology  to  analyze 
the  conduct  and  performance  of  monetary  policy  in  six industrialized 
countries  for the period  from the breakup of the Bretton Woods  system 
until  the  present.  In doing  so,  we  hope  to gain  some  insight  into  the 
objectives and constraints  that determine  central bank behavior and-at 
this stage,  in a very tentative  way-to  develop  some  hypotheses  about 
the attributes of successful  monetary  strategies. 
The case  study  method  has  a poor  reputation  in economics,  largely 
because  of the tendency  of its users  to treat anecdotes  as evidence.  We 
fully agree that case studies  are not a substitute  either for more system- 
atic  empirical  work  or  formal  theoretical  modeling.  However,  in  our 
opinion,  this approach  can be a valuable  preliminary  to the more stan- 
dard types  of research.  First, case studies  can help establish  the histori- 
cal and institutional  context,  an essential  first step in good applied work. 
Second,  historical analysis  of actual policy  experiences  is a natural way 
to  find  substantive  hypotheses  that  subsequent  work  can  model  and 
test  more  formally.  We  believe  that  the  method  of  developing  initial 
hypotheses  exhibited  here  is  superior  to  the  more  typical,  implicit 
method  of developing  hypotheses,  which  relies  on introspection  or on 
knowledge  of only  a few  episodes. 
The bulk of our paper consists  of brief narrative discussions  of recent 
monetary  policy-making  in  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Canada,  Germany,  Switzerland,  and Japan. From these  case  histories, 
as well  as from our reading  of central bank reports and the commentar- 
ies of observers,  we  distill a number  of hypotheses-candidate  empiri- 
cal  regularities,  if  you  will-about  central  bank  behavior,  policy 
strategies,  and  policy  outcomes.  These  hypotheses  are of  two  types. 
Positive hypotheses, which  receive  most  of  our  attention,  are based  on 
observations  that hold  for all or nearly all of the cases  examined;  to the 
extent  that  these  observations  are  confirmed  by  additional  research, 
they need  to be explained  by positive  theories  of central bank behavior. 
Normative  hypotheses,  in contrast, are about differences  in the characteris- 
tics  of  monetary  policy  strategies  between  more  and  less  successful 
economies.  We  call these  hypotheses  normative  because-despite  the 
great difficulties  involved  in  inferring  causation  from correlation-we 
believe  that these  cross-sectional  differences  ultimately  may help to pro- 
vide useful  lessons  about the design  of monetary  policy.  We emphasize 
again,  though,  that  at  this  stage  both  the  positive  and  normative 
hypotheses  are to be treated not as conclusions  but as suggestive  propo- 
sitions  that are advanced  for further discussion,  analysis,  and testing. 
Of the various positive  hypotheses  that we extract from the case stud- 
ies,  three of the most  important  are the following: 
First, in their conduct  of monetary  policy,  central bankers  appear  to 186 *  BERNANKE  & MISHKIN 
be pursuing  multiple  economic  objectives;  they  care not only  about the 
behavior  of inflation  and unemployment  but sometimes  also,  indepen- 
dently,  about the behavior  of variables such as exchange  rates and inter- 
est  rates.  Further,  instead  of  giving  equal  weight  to  all  objectives,  a 
large part of the monetary  policymaker's  attention  at any given  time is 
devoted  to  the  variable  that  is  currently  "in  crisis,"  to  the  neglect  of 
other concerns. 
Each of the  central banks  we  consider  has  employed  official money 
growth  targets  over  all  or  a  substantial  part  of  the  recent  period.  A 
second  positive  hypothesis  is that-consistent,  perhaps,  with their "cri- 
sis  mentality"-central  bankers  are  more  likely  to  adopt  targets  for 
money  growth,  or to increase  their emphasis  on  meeting  existing  tar- 
gets,  when  inflation  is perceived  as the number  one  problem. 
This tendency  of central bankers  to retreat to money  growth  targets 
when  inflation  increases  is something  of a puzzle.  For example,  as we 
discuss  later, this behavior  is not easily explained  by Poole's  (1970) clas- 
sic analysis  of target choice.  We conjecture  (based  in part on  what  the 
central bankers  themselves  say) that there are two  reasons  why  central 
bankers cling to money  targets when  inflation  threatens:  (1) High infla- 
tion  causes  policymakers  to  become  less  confident  in  their  ability  to 
assess  the stance  of policy; intermediate  targets such  as money  growth 
targets are perceived  to be useful  as guideposts or compasses  that aid in 
choosing  the  appropriate  policy  setting.  (2) Perhaps  more  important, 
money  growth  targets may be particularly useful  as signals of the mone- 
tary authorities'  intention  to get tough  on inflation.  As we explain later, 
signalling  its anti-inflationary  intentions  may help the central bank both 
to manage  the  public's  expectations  and  to  defend  its policies  against 
political pressures  for more  expansionary  policies. 
A third positive  observation  is that-although  banks occasionally  con- 
duct  policy  using  a strategy  approaching  pure  discretion-they  never 
adhere  to  strict, ironclad  rules.  Indeed,  a common  strategy  resembles 
most nearly a hybrid of rules and discretion,  in which  the central bank 
attempts  (with varying  degrees  of success)  to apply rules to its medium- 
term and  long-term  policies,  while  retaining  "flexibility" or discretion 
to respond  to developments  in the economy  in the short run. We view 
this  observation  as  quite  interesting  because  it  challenges  the  simple 
view  of much  of the received  literature that pure rules and pure discre- 
tion are the only  policy  strategies  available. 
Perhaps  the most  intriguing  normative  hypothesis  suggested  by our 
case studies  is that-contrary  to what  might  be inferred from Kydland 
and  Prescott  (1977)-hybrid  monetary  strategies  of  the  type  just  de- 
scribed appear to be consistent  with  low  and  stable inflation  rates.  For 
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extent,  Japan-have  been  able  to pursue  money  growth  targets  as an 
intermediate-term  objective,  while  at the same time maintaining  consid- 
erable  short-run  discretion  to  meet  objectives  such  as  exchange  rate 
stabilization.  Several  factors seem  to be  associated  with  successful  use 
of a hybrid strategy,  each of which  can be construed  as helping  to make 
credible the central bank's  claim that it will follow  rules in the medium 
run, though  not in the  short run: 
First, we  observe  particularly in the German and Swiss  cases  that the 
central bank's  intermediate  targets  are  explicitly  linked,  via  a  simple 
and public calculation,  to the ultimate  goals  of policy  (e.g.,  the desired 
inflation rate). In principle,  this explicit linkage of targets to goals allows 
the central bank to adjust its targets when  the  target-goal  relationship 
changes,  without  compromising  its credibility. 
Second,  the  central banks  who  successfully  use  the  hybrid  strategy 
tend to conduct  policy  in a more straightforward  and transparent  way, 
avoiding  devices  such  as  multiple  targets,  "base  drift,"  and  irregular 
changes  in targets or target growth  rates. 
Finally,  achieving  low  inflation  via  the  hybrid  strategy  seems  to re- 
quire some commitment  by the central bank to reverse short-term devia- 
tions  from target over  a longer  period.  In the  case  of a money  growth 
rule,  for  example,  periods  of  above-target  money  growth  tend  to  be 
compensated  for  (in  low-inflation  countries)  by  subsequent  money 
growth  reductions. 
The rest of the  paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section  2,  the  bulk of 
the  paper,  presents  the  six  case  studies  of  monetary  policy-making. 
Section 3 lists and discusses  our positive  hypotheses  about central bank 
behavior.  Section  4 both  discusses  our normative  hypotheses  and  ad- 
dresses  important  issues  that remain unresolved. 
2. The  Conduct  of Monetary  Policy  in Six Industrialized 
Countries,  1973-1991 
To provide  some  empirical basis for discussing  the conduct  of monetary 
policy,  this  section  provides  brief  narrative  descriptions  of  monetary 
policy  in  six industrialized  countries  over  the  period  since  the  break- 
down  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  The  countries  discussed  are the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Germany  (representing 
the  EMS bloc),  Switzerland,  and  Japan.  These  six countries  represent 
"independent"  observations  in the  sense  that,  for most  of the  period, 
no two  of them belonged  to a common  system  of fixed exchange  rates.3 
3. On this basis  we  exclude  France and  Italy, whose  exchange  rates are tied to the deut- 
schemark  through  the  Exchange  Rate Mechanism  (ERM). (The U.K.  did  not  join  the 188 *  BERNANKE  & MISHKIN 
Other  countries  with  independent  monetary  policies,  such  as Sweden 
and Australia,  would  be interesting  to study  but are excluded  because 
of space  and data limitations. 
Our focus here is on general strategies and approaches  used  by mone- 
tary policymakers;  where  possible,  we  abstract from  the  fine  institu- 
tional  details  of  monetary  policy  operations  in  the  various  countries, 
except as they impinge  on the broader issues.4  In discussing  the experi- 
ences  of the various  countries,  however,  it is useful  to draw the familiar 
distinctions  among  policy  goals,  instruments,  and intermediate  targets 
(see,  e.g.,  McCallum,  1989, or Friedman,  1990). Goals are the final objec- 
tives of policy,  for example,  price stability and economic  growth.  Instru- 
ments are variables  that the  central bank controls  closely  on  a daily  or 
weekly  basis,  such  as nonborrowed  reserves  or the  interbank  lending 
rate; the choice  of instruments  and  the mechanisms  by which  they  are 
controlled  determine  the  central bank's  operating procedure.  Intermediate 
targets-monetary  aggregates  are the most common  example-are  vari- 
ables that are neither  under  the direct day-to-day  control of the central 
bank  nor  are the  ultimate  goals  of  policy,  but  that  are used  to  guide 
policy.  Values for instruments  are usually  set so that, given  estimates  of 
behavioral  parameters  such  as the interest  elasticity  of money  demand, 
intermediate  targets for variables  such as M1 growth  are reached in the 
longer  term  (quarter-to-quarter  or year-to-year).  In turn,  intermediate 
targets are set or reset periodically  so as to be consistent  with the central 
bank's ultimate  economic  objectives. 
The narrative discussions  that follow  are supplemented  by two types 
of more quantitative  evidence.  First, Tables 1-6  present,  for each coun- 
try separately,  the record of announced  targets for money  growth,  the 
actual money  growth  outcomes,  and the implied  excess  money  growth 
(actual growth  less  the midpoint  of the target range).  Second,  compari- 
sons  across countries  of the behavior  of several key monetary  and mac- 
roeconomic  variables  are  provided  by  Figures  1-7  at  the  end  of  the 
paper.  The monthly  data shown  in the figures  are as follows:5 
(Fig. 1)-money  growth  rates  (from 1 year earlier) of both  the  narrow 
and the broad monetary  aggregate  focused  on by the central bank in 
each country  (MO, M1, M2, or M3). 
(Fig. 2)-the  variability of narrow and broad money  growth  (e.g.,  SDM1 
ERM until 1990.) Of course,  attempts  to stabilize nominal  exchange  rates have affected 
monetary  policy  at various  times  in all of these  countries;  as we  discuss  later, Canada 
in particular has often  subordinated  its monetary  policy  to exchange  rate objectives. 
4. Excellent discussions  of the "microstructure" of monetary institutions  and policy opera- 
tions  can be  found  in Kneeshaw  and  Van  den  Bergh (1989), Batten et al.  (1990), and 
Kasman (1991). 
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or SDM2); measured  as the  standard  deviation  over  the  previous  12 
months  of the money  growth  rates in Figure 1.6 
(Fig. 3)-interest  rates on  overnight  interbank  loans  (RS) and  on long- 
term government  bonds  (RL). 
(Fig. 4)-the  variability of changes  in overnight  interbank and long-term 
interest  rates  (SDRS or SDRL); measured  using  the  same  12-month 
moving-average  procedure  as in Figure 2. 
(Fig. 5)-indices  of nominal  exchange  rates (ER); measured  as the Fed- 
eral Reserve's  effective  exchange  rate index  for the United  States and 
as  the  value  of  the  currency  in  U.S.  dollars  for other  countries  (an 
increase  in the index  always  implies  an appreciation). 
(Fig. 6)-inflation  rates  (PI); measured  as  the  log-change  of consumer 
prices over the last 12 months. 
(Fig. 7)-unemployment  rates  (UN);  civilian  labor force,  national  defi- 
nitions. 
The United States.7 We begin  with  the  United  States because  it is the 
best  documented  case  and  because  the  U.S.  experience  has  played  an 
important role in setting  the agenda  for previous  analyses  of monetary 
policy. 
The conduct  of monetary  policy  in the  United  States  since  the  early 
1970s is conventionally  divided  into  three regimes.  During  the first re- 
gime  (approximately  1970-1979),  the federal funds  rate-the  interbank 
lending  rate-was  the primary instrument  of monetary  policy,  serving 
in various  degrees  as a target of policy as well.  Open  market operations 
were  used  to keep  the funds  rate within  a narrow target band  (usually 
on  the  order of 50-75  basis  points);  over  time,  the band  was  adjusted 
smoothly  (usually  in  25  or 50 basis  point  increments)  in  response  to 
general  macroeconomic  conditions.8 
6. Huizinga  and Mishkin  (1986)  have pointed out potential  problems  with moving-average 
measures of volatility. Thus we have also calculated  volatility  measures using a proce- 
dure suggested by Pagan (1984), which effectively assumes an autoregressive  condi- 
tional  heteroscedasticity  (ARCH)  specification  for the variability  of money growth. The 
results using this procedure yield similar  conclusions to those provided by Figures 2 
and 4. 
7. Numerous sources discuss recent  monetary  policy and the policy process in the United 
States. See, e.g.,  Lombra (forthcoming),  Karamouzis  and Lombra  (1989), Friedman 
(1988), Poole (1988), and Heller (1988). For a longer-term  overview, see Meulendyke 
(1990).  In this and all subsequent  case studies we also made use of the OECD's  Economic 
Surveys. 
8. Bernanke  and Blinder (forthcoming)  present evidence for the veiw that, during this 
period, changes in the funds rate (or the spread  between the funds rate  and other  rates) 
were the best signal of a changing stance of monetary policy. Cook and Hahn (1989) 
provide a record of funds rate target changes and show that, during the 1975-1979 
period, open-market interest rates responded sensitively to changes in the Federal 
Reserve's  target  for the funds rate. 190  BERNANKE  & MISHKIN 
Table 1  MONEY  GROWTH  TARGETS  AND OUTCOMES:  UNITED  STATES 
Outcome 
Year  Aggregate  Target  Outcome  less target 
1975  ml  5.0-7.5  5.3  - 1.0 
M2  8.5-10.5  9.7  + 0.2 
M3  10.0-12.0  12.3  +1.3 
1976  ml  4.5-7.5  5.8  -0.2 
M2  7.5-10.5  10.9  +1.9 
M3  9.0-12.0  12.7  + 2.2 
1977  ml  4.5-6.5  7.9  + 2.4 
M2  7.0-10.0  3.8  -4.7 
M3  8.5-11.5  11.7  +1.7 
1978  ml  4.0-6.5  7.2  +2.0 
M2  6.5-9.0  8.7  + 1.0 
M3  7.5-10.0  9.5  +0.8 
1979  ml  3.0-6.0  5.5  + 1.0 
M2  5.0-8.0  8.3  +1.8 
M3  6.0-9.0  8.1  +0.6 
1980  ml  4.0-6.5  7.3  +2.1 
M2  6.0-9.0  9.6  +2.1 
M3  6.5-9.5  10.2  +2.2 
1981  ml  3.5-6.0  2.3  -3.0 
M2  6.0-9.0  9.5  +2.0 
M3  6.5-9.5  11.4  +3.4 
1982  ml  2.5-5.5  8.5  +4.5 
M2  6.0-9.0  9.2  +1.7 
M3  6.5-9.5  10.1  +2.1 
1983  ml  4.0-8.0  10.0  +4.0 
M2  7.0-10.0  8.3  -0.2 
M3  6.5-9.5  9.7  +1.7 
1984  ml  4.0-8.0  5.2  -0.8 
M2  6.0-9.0  7.7  +0.2 
M3  6.0-9.0  10.5  + 3.0 
1985  ml  4.0-7.0  11.9  +6.4 
M2  6.0-9.0  8.6  + 1.1 
M3  6.0-9.5  7.4  -0.4 
1986  ml  3.0-8.0  15.2  +9.7 
M2  6.0-9.0  8.9  +1.4 
M3  6.0-9.0  8.8  +1.3 
1987  M2  5.5-8.5  4.3  -2.7 
M3  5.5-8.5  5.6  -1.4 Central Bank Behavior  and the Strategy of Monetary Policy ? 191 
Table 1  MONEY GROWTH TARGETS AND  OUTCOMES: UNITED STATES 
Outcome 
Year  Aggregate  Target  Outcome  less target 
1988  M2  4.0-8.0  5.2  -0.8 
M3  4.0-8.0  6.1  +0.1 
1989  M2  3.0-7.0  4.7  -0.3 
M3  3.5-7.5  3.3  -2.2 
1990  M2  3.0-7.0  3.8  -1.2 
M3  2.5-6.5  1.5  -3.0 
1991  M2  2.5-6.5  2.7  -1.8 
M3  1.0-5.0  1.5  -1.5 
Notes:  Growth  rates (%)  are measured  fourth  quarter  to fourth  quarter.  Outcome  less target  equals the 
outcome  less the midpoint  of the target  range. Data reflects  definitions  of aggregates  current  at times 
of announcements.  Target  ranges are those announced  at the beginning  of the year (midyear  changes 
occurred  in 1979,  1983,  1985,  and 1990).  Target  and outcome  for 1981  Ml growth  are adjusted  for shifts 
into NOW accounts. 
Sources:  Isard  and Rojas-Suarez  (1986)  and Fischer  (1987);  updates from annual "Monetary  Report  to 
Congress,"  March  or April  issues of Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
In  principle,  during  this  period,  the  Fed  paid  attention  to  money 
growth  as  well  as  to  interest  rates: Beginning  in  1970,  the  FOMC se- 
lected weekly  tracking paths for M1 and indicated  its preferred behavior 
for M2 (Meulendyke,  1990), and in 1975, in response  to a congressional 
resolution,  the  Fed  began  to  announce  publicly  its  targets  for money 
growth (Table 1). In practice, however,  the Fed did not consider meeting 
money  growth  targets to be of high  priority,  placing  greater weight  on 
reducing  unemployment  while  maintaining  a  relatively  smooth  path 
for interest  rates.  Devices  employed  by  the  Fed  to avoid  being  overly 
constrained  by money  growth  targets included  the setting  of targets for 
more than one  aggregate,  which  usually  allowed  it to claim that it was 
hitting at least some  target; and the frequent  resort to "base drift," that 
is,  the  ignoring  of past  deviations  of money  growth  from target when 
setting  new  targets.9 
As can be seen  from Table 1 or Figure la,  Ml  growth  had an upward 
trend  after  1975 despite  declining  target  ranges.  With  hindsight,  the 
9. Walsh (1986) defends base drift as the correct response to nonstationary shocks to 
money demand. It seems to us that this case requires that the central bank clearly 
identify-and  explain to the public-the  source of these nonstationary  shocks, other- 
wise base drift will be perceived as a ploy. The fact that inflation rose significantly 
in  the  late  1970s is  evidence  against  the  view  that  the  Fed  was  optimally  offsetting 
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money  expansion  of 1975-1978  appears  to have been  excessive:  Unem- 
ployment  came  down  steadily  during  the  1975-1978  period  (Fig.  7a), 
but  the  dollar  fell  (Fig.  5a)  and  inflation  heated  up  sharply  (Fig.  6a), 
even  in advance  of the second  oil shock. 
The funds  rate targeting regime-or  its first act-came  to an end with 
the dramatic news  conference  of Fed Chairman Paul Volcker on October 
6, 1979, in which  Volcker signalled  a new  commitment  to reduce  infla- 
tion  by  a change  in  Fed  operating  procedures.  The  new  regime  that 
followed  the 1979 announcement  was  described  by the Fed as targeting 
nonborrowed  bank reserves,  an operating  procedure  sometimes  charac- 
terized (e.g.,  by Lombra, forthcoming)  as intermediate  between  the per- 
fectly  elastic  supply  of reserves  associated  with  an interest  rate target 
and the inelastic  supply  of reserves  associated  with  a strict money  tar- 
get. Under a system  of targeted  nonborrowed  reserves,  increases  in the 
overall demand  for reserves,  arising,  for example,  from an increase  in 
money  demand,  are reflected  both  by  an increase  in  the  money  stock 
(as banks  increase  borrowed  reserves)  and by an increase  in the funds 
rate (which must increase to make banks indifferent between  borrowing 
more from the discount  window  and purchasing  more federal funds  on 
the interbank market). 
Because  nonborrowed  reserves  targets  were  not  set  far in  advance 
and were  often adjusted,  however,  the 1979 change  in operating  proce- 
dure did not in itself necessarily  require a major change  in the conduct 
of U.S.  monetary  policy,  except  perhaps  at very  high  (daily or hourly) 
frequencies.  For example,  nonborrowed  reserve  targets could in princi- 
ple  have  been  set  week  to week  to keep  the  funds  rate from  straying 
far from  a preferred  range.  However,  the  change  in  operating  proce- 
dures  seems  to  have  been  accompanied  by  a  decision  by  the  Fed  to 
place greater weight  on monetary  targets and to tolerate high  and vola- 
tile interest rates (see Figs. 3a and 4a) in order to bring down  inflation.?1 
The change  in interest  rate behavior  was  particularly dramatic: Instead 
of  smoothing  the  funds  rate in  its  customary  way,  after the  October 
1979  announcement,  the  Fed  whipsawed  the  financial  markets;  the 
funds  rose by more than 500 basis points  to exceed  17% in March 1980, 
fell to  below  10% after real GNP  declined  in the  second  quarter,  and 
then rose to nearly 20% in 1981. M1 growth was noticeably lower during 
10. Fed reaction  functions estimated by McNees (1986)  and by Karamouzis  and Lombra 
(1989)  show that the Fed placed a greater  weight on deviations of the money supply 
from target during 1979-1982, relative  to earlier  and later  periods. Cook (1989),  in an 
excellent discussion of 1979-1982 policy, argues that high-interest  rates were not an 
accidental  byproduct of the nonborrowed  reserves procedure  but that nonborrowed 
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the  1979-1981  period  than  in  previous  years,  but  there  also  was  a 
significant  (and  permanent)  increase  in  the  volatility  of  M1  growth 
(Fig. 2a).11 
What are we  to  make  of  the  sharp  changes  in Fed  operating  proce- 
dures that occurred during  and after 1979? The most  likely explanation 
of these  changes  is political rather than technical.  The Fed had decided 
that inflation had reached crisis levels  and had to be controlled at almost 
any cost.  As many  authors  have noted,12 the new  operating  procedures 
and  the  greater  (putative)  attention  to monetary  targets  were  a useful 
smokescreen  that obscured  the  link between  the Fed's actions  and  the 
painful  increases  in  interest  rates.  At  the  same  time,  the  changes  in 
procedure  signalled  to the  public  that they  should  not expect  business 
as usual  with  respect  to the Fed's attitude  toward  inflation. 
Volcker's policy shift achieved  its disinflationary  goals but contributed 
to  a deep  recession  in  1981-1982.  Velocity  instability  associated  with 
financial  innovation  and  other  factors  also  raised  concerns  (based  on 
the  traditional  Poole,  1970,  analysis)  about  whether  monetary  targets 
would  continue  to  be  of  any  value  for  guiding  policy.  In  the  fall  of 
1982, the  Fed  switched  tactics again,  this  time  to a borrowed  reserves 
operating  procedure.  Simultaneously,  it adopted  a decidedly  easier pol- 
icy,  despite  the  fact that money  growth  was  above  its targeted  range 
(Table 1). Money  targets  were  deemphasized  after 1982. In particular, 
M1 was  allowed  to deviate  quite far from its targets and after 1986 was 
no longer  targeted  at all. 
Because  there is a close  link between  desired  borrowed  reserves  and 
the funds  rate, the borrowed  reserves  procedure  adopted  in 1982 is,  in 
practice, quite  similar to funds  rate targeting.13 Thus,  the  third regime 
of post-1973 monetary  policy  in the  United  States is a return to an em- 
phasis  on interest  rate smoothing,  as in the  pre-1979 monetary  regime 
(note  from  Fig.  4a  that  after  1982,  interest  rate volatility  returned  to 
pre-1979 levels).  During  the  1990-1991  recession,  the  degree  to which 
11. Added complexity  in the use of M1 as a policy guide was created  by a redefinition  of 
M1, to include other checkable  deposits such as NOW accounts  but to exclude  foreign- 
held deposits, in 1980. 
12. For example, see Greider  (1987),  Mussa (forthcoming),  and Mishkin (1992). 
13. The demand for borrowed  reserves  is usually taken to be an increasing  function  of the 
spread  between the federal  funds rate  and the discount rate, reflecting  the equilibrium 
condition that banks must be indifferent between obtaining funds from the federal 
funds market  and from the discount window. If this demand function is stable, then 
targeting  borrowed  reserves  is equivalent  to targeting  the excess of the funds rate  over 
the discount  rate. See Thornton  (1988).  Thornton  also presents evidence that, on those 
occasions  when the demand for borrowed  reserves  appeared  to shift, the Fed typically 
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Fed policy  has been  guided  by and  expressed  in terms  of interest  rate 
targets rather than  money  or reserve  growth  targets  has  been  particu- 
larly striking.  For example,  the  Fed's  "shock  treatment"  of  December 
1991 was  couched  solely  in terms of funds  rate and discount  rate reduc- 
tions.14 
While  the  Fed  concentrated  relatively  more  on  stabilizing  interest 
rates after 1982, it also  pursued  several  other goals.  One  key  objective 
during  the latter part of the  1980s was  exchange  rate stabilization: The 
sharp appreciation  of the dollar during the Volcker regime  (Fig. 5a) had 
contributed  to  a massive  increase  in  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit. 
Beginning  in early 1985, the Fed attempted  to bring down  the dollar by 
driving up both M1 and M2 growth  rates (Fig. la).  By 1987, policymak- 
ers  at the  Fed  agreed  that  the  dollar  had  fallen  enough,  and  money 
growth  rates were  brought  back down.  These  actions  by the  Fed were 
supported  by  attempts  at  international  policy  coordination  embodied 
by the Plaza Accord in September  1985 and the Louvre Accord in Febru- 
ary 1987. 
Other  objectives  that  influenced  monetary  policy  during  the  1980s 
included  financial  market  stability  (particularly following  the  October 
1987 stock  market  crash;  see  Brimmer,  1989,  Mishkin,  1991) and  the 
maintenance  of  Volcker's  inflation  gains.  On  the  price  stability  front, 
the Fed was  particularly successful,  as for the  first time  since  the early 
1960s, inflation  in the latter part of the  1980s remained  low  and  stable. 
Whether the good inflation performance  of recent years was due primar- 
ily to good  luck (e.g.,  falling oil prices)  or agile policy  is controversial. 
The United Kingdom.15  As  has  often  been  discussed,  there  are some 
broad parallels between  the  recent  histories  of British and  U.S.  mone- 
tary policies,  as there were for general economic  policies under Thatcher 
and Reagan. 
As in the United  States,  the British introduced  money  targeting in the 
mid-1970s  in  response  to  mounting  inflation  concerns.  Also  as in  the 
United  States,  the  Bank  of  England  used  interest  rates  as  operating 
instruments  and was  committed  to interest-rate  smoothing  during  this 
period.  Informal targeting  of a broad aggregate,  sterling  M3 (hereafter 
M3), began  in late 1973, and formal publication  of targets began in 1976 
(Table 2), following  a spike  in inflation  and in conjunction  with  an IMF 
14. A principal reason for the deemphasis of money growth was the perception that 
the "credit  crunch"  in banking had interfered  with the normal relationship  between 
aggregates  such as M2 and nominal GNP;  see Bernanke  and Lown (1991)  for a discus- 
sion of the credit crunch and its implications  for monetary  policy. 
15. Good recent descriptions of U.K. monetary policy are to be found in Fischer  (1987), 
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Table 2  MONEY GROWTH TARGETS AND  OUTCOMES: 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Outcome 
Period  Aggregate  Target  Outcome  less target 
April 1976-April  1977  M3  9-131  8.0  -3.0 
April 1977-April  1978  M3  9-13  15.1  +4.1 
April 1978-April  1979  M3  8-122  11.4  +1.4 
October 1978-October  1979  M3  8-123  13.7  +3.7 
June 1979-October  1980  M3  7-114  17.2  +8.2 
February 1980-April  1981  M3  7-115  19.4  +10.4 
February 1981-April  1982  M3  6-10  12.8  +4.8 
February 1982-April  1983  Ml  8-12  12.4  +2.4 
M3  8-12  11.2  +1.2 
PSL2  8-12  11.6  +1.6 
February 1983-April  1984  M1  7-11  14.0  +5.0 
M3  7-11  9.5  +0.5 
PSL2  7-11  12.6  +3.6 
February 1984-April  1985  MO  4-86  5.4  -0.6 
M3  6-10  11.9  +3.9 
March 1985-March  1986  MO  3-7  3.4  -1.6 
M3  5-97  16.7  +9.7 
March 1986-March  1987  MO  2-6  4.4  +0.4 
M3  11-158  19.0  +6.0 
March 1987-March  1988  MO  2-6  5.6  +1.6 
March 1988-March  1989  MO  1-5  6.1  +3.1 
March 1989-March  1990  MO  1-5  6.3  +3.3 
March 1990-March  1991  MO  1-5  2.6  -0.4 
March 1991-March  1992  MO  0-4 
Notes:  M3 refers to sterling  M3, or M3 less residents' deposits abroad.  PSL2,  private  sector liquidity, 
is a broader  aggregate  than M3. Outcome  less target  equals  the outcome  less the midpoint  of the target 
range. 'Target  of 12%  growth for M3 set in July  1976  superseded  by 9-13% target  for M3 in December 
1976  'letter  of intent' to IMF.  2New target  after  6 months. 3New target  after  8 months. 4Original  target 
was to April 1980. Target  was extended in October  1979 for 1 year, but then new target  was set for 
period  beginning  February  1980.  5From  1980  to 1986,  target  ranges for M3 were also set for a 3-4-year 
horizon.  6Beginning  in 1984,  target  ranges  for MO  were also set for  a 4-year  horizon.  7Target  suspended 
in October  1985.  8Target  suspended in October  1986. 
Sources:  Temperton  (1991),  supplemented  by OECD  Economic  Surveys,  various  issues. 
support  arrangement.  To  help  ensure  that  M3  targets  were  met,  the 
Supplementary  Special  Deposits  Scheme-the  infamous  "corset"-was 
introduced  in  December  1973.  The  corset  scheme  attempted  to  reduce 
M3 growth  essentially  by  taxing  a component  of M3,  high-interest  bank 
deposits. 
Elementary  economic  analysis  suggests  that  a  scheme  to  reduce  the 
growth  rate  of  monetary  aggregate  artificially  through  tax  policy  would 
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variables  such  as nominal  income  and  inflation.  Thus,  the  reliance  on 
the corset is evidence  that, during the pre-1979 period,  the British mone- 
tary authorities  were  like  their  U.S.  counterparts  in  not  taking  their 
money  growth  targets  very  seriously.  It is interesting  that,  despite  the 
assistance  of  the  corset,  the  Bank  of  England  had  great  difficulty  in 
meeting  its  M3 growth  targets  during  this  period:  Not  only  were  an- 
nounced  targets  consistently  overshot,  but  the  Bank  of  England  fre- 
quently  revised  its  targets  midstream  or  abandoned  them  altogether 
(Table 2). One  result  of these  policies  was  that British monetary  aggre- 
gates  had  greater volatility  than  even  those  in  the  United  States  (Fig. 
2b).  For  example,  the  volatility  of  U.S.  monetary  base  growth  (not 
shown  in the figures)  was  on average  well  less  than half that of British 
monetary  base  growth  in the  pre-1979 period,  and the  same  is true for 
M3 growth. 
Although  inflation  fell subsequent  to the  1973 oil price shock,  begin- 
ning  in  1978 prices  in the  United  Kingdom  began  to accelerate  again, 
with inflation ultimately  reaching  nearly 20% by 1980. As in the United 
States, the perception  of an inflationary crisis led to a change  in strategy 
in  1979.  Prime  Minister  Thatcher's  Medium-Term  Financial  Strategy 
(MTFS,  formally  introduced  in  the  government's  second  budget  in 
March 1980) included  three main components:  a gradual deceleration  in 
M3 growth,  elimination  of various  controls  on the economy  (including 
the corset,  exchange  controls,  and incomes  policies),  and a reduction  of 
the PSBR (the public sector borrowing  requirement,  or deficit). A central 
goal  of this  program  was  the  restoration  of  credibility  for the  govern- 
ment's  anti-inflationary  policies; it was  in order to enhance  the credibil- 
ity of proposed  reductions  in money  growth  that the government  opted 
for reduced  government  deficits  instead  of lower  taxes,  a la Reagan.16 
Unfortunately,  the  British  disinflationary  strategy  in  the  1979-1982 
period  ran into  a technical  problem  similar to  that experienced  in  the 
United States, namely,  that the relationship  between  the targeted aggre- 
gate  and  nominal  income  became  very  unstable.  M3  velocity  fell 
sharply,  and  M3 grew  at rates  well  above  the  target ranges  (Table 2, 
Fig. lb),  even  as other indicators-the  value  of the pound,  the growth 
rates of narrower money  aggregates,  and the unemployment  and infla- 
tion rates-all  began to signal that monetary  policy was very tight (Figs. 
lb-7b).  In retrospect,  the  instability  of  M3 is  not  surprising,  because 
16. Another difference  with the U.S. approach  was that the British  did not significantly 
reduce their commitment to interest rate smoothing with the change in strategy in 
1979 (Fig. 4b). This confirms the earlier  point that there is no necessary connection 
between the operating  procedure  and the general stance of monetary  policy. Central  Bank  Behavior  and the  Strategy  of Monetary  Policy  ? 197 
the removal of the corset induced  banks to market high-interest  deposits 
aggressively.  Other  factors,  such  as the  phasing  out  of exchange  con- 
trols  and  an  increased  pace  of  financial  innovation,  also  affected  the 
growth  rate of M3. The monetary  authorities  tried several  strategies  in 
response  to  this  instability,  including  the  setting  of  multiyear  target 
ranges  (which,  for the  most  part,  were  not  met)  and  the  targeting  of 
several aggregates  simultaneously.17 
Subsequent  to  1983, arguing  that financial  innovation  was  wreaking 
havoc  with  the  relationship  between  broad  money  and  income,18 the 
Bank of England began  to deemphasize  M3 in favor of narrower aggre- 
gates,  particularly MO (the monetary  base).  The target for M3 was  tem- 
porarily suspended  in October 1985 and finally dropped  in 1987, leaving 
MO  as the only  money  aggregate  to be targeted.  Generally,  the attempt 
to  target MO was  more  successful  than  earlier attempts  to  target M3: 
Target ranges  have  been  announced  on  a regular basis  and  have  been 
gradually  reduced  over  time.  Also,  since  1984,  actual  MO growth  has 
generally  fallen  within  or  close  to  the  target  ranges,  with  under-  or 
overshootings  tending  to be reversed  in subsequent  years. 
The  major exception  to  the  assertion  that  MO growth  has  been  on 
target occurred  in  the  1987-1988  period,  during  which  the  authorities 
became  concerned  about  appreciation  of  the  pound  and  informally 
"capped"  sterling  at 3.00  DM  to  the  pound,  resulting  in  more  rapid 
money  growth  (see  Fig.  lb  and  Table  2).  Some  economists,  such  as 
Belongia and Chrystal (1990), have argued  that this episode  was less an 
attempt  to manage  the  exchange  rate per se  than it was  an attempt  to 
find  a new  nominal  anchor  for monetary  policy,  given  the  problems 
experienced  with  monetary  aggregates.  If so,  in this instance  the Bank 
of  England  backed  the  wrong  horse,  because  following  the  period  of 
the  cap,  inflation  rose  sharply,  a development  that  was  predicted  by 
rapid growth  of the monetary  base  during the period  of the cap. What- 
ever interpretation  one  places  on  the  "capping"  episode,  however,  in 
October 1990-after  much  debate-the  United  Kingdom  decided  to ac- 
cept the discipline  of a fixed nominal  exchange  rate by joining the Euro- 
pean  Exchange  Rate Mechanism  (ERM). 
Overall,  a comparison  with  the United  States and the other countries 
examined  here does  not put British monetary  policy in a favorable light. 
As Figures 6 and 7 indicate,  not only has British inflation had the highest 
mean and the greatest volatility of any of these  countries,  but the unem- 
17. Besides MO  and M3, the Bank of England also targeted a broad measure of private 
sector liquidity, PLS2;  see Table  2. 
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ployment  rate has  also been  high  and variable.  However,  in the  1980s, 
British inflation  performance  did improve  considerably,  remaining  well 
below  the  1970s level  and becoming  significantly  less  variable. 
Canada.19  Recent Canadian monetary  experience  bears some close par- 
allels to that of the  United  States  and  Britain. This parallel experience 
is not purely a coincidence,  of course,  as Canadian monetary  policy has 
often-although  not always-been  driven by the goal of maintaining  a 
stable exchange  rate with the United  States (Fig. 5c). As a result, interest 
rates (Fig. 3), interest  rate volatility  (Fig. 4),  and inflation  (Fig. 6) have 
followed  generally  similar patterns  in the two  countries. 
Like the  other countries  discussed  here,  Canada experienced  signifi- 
cant  inflation  problems  in  the  mid-1970s,  problems  that  were  clearly 
exacerbated  by  its  attempt  to  contain  the  appreciation  of  its  currency 
after the breakdown  of the Bretton Woods  system.  Like the other coun- 
tries,  Canada  responded  by  adopting  money  growth  targets.  In 1975, 
as part of a larger government  initiative  that included  the imposition  of 
wage  and  price controls,  the  Bank of Canada introduced  a program of 
"monetary  gradualism,"  under  which  M1 growth  would  be controlled 
within a gradually falling target range (Table 3). The change in monetary 
strategy did not extend  to a change  in operating  procedures,  however, 
which  continued  to emphasize  an interest  rate instrument. 
Monetary  gradualism  was  no  more  successful  in Canada  than  were 
initial attempts  at money  targeting  in the United  States and the United 
Kingdom,  and arguably-as  in the  other two  countries-a  lack of seri- 
ousness  on  the  part of the  central bank was  a contributing  factor. An- 
nouncements  of  new  money  targets  were  made  irregularly  and 
employed  base periods  for the measurement  of money  growth that were 
as much  as 6 months  earlier than the date of the announcement  (Table 
3). Although  actual M1 growth  was  often  very  close  to target,  and  the 
goal of reducing  M1 growth  was  achieved  during  the latter part of the 
decade,  subsequent  to  the  adoption  of  gradualism  Canada  suffered  a 
sharp  depreciation  of its  currency  and,  like the  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  a resurgence  in inflation. 
In defense  of the  Bank of Canada,  many  of the  same  problems  that 
plagued  attempts  to target money  growth  in other countries  were  pres- 
ent in Canada as well,  including  financial innovation  (see Howitt,  forth- 
coming),  velocity  instability  of  the  targeted  aggregate,  and  radically 
different  signals  of policy  stance  from narrow and broad money  aggre- 
gates (Fig. lc).  Overlaying  these  standard problems were the distortions 
19. Principal  sources for this section are Howitt (forthcoming),  the OECD Economic  Sur- 
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Table  3  MONEY  GROWTH  TARGETS  AND OUTCOMES:  CANADA 
Announcement  Base  M1 growth  Outcome 
date  period  target  Outcome  less target 
November 1975  April-June 1975  10-15  9.3  -3.2 
August 1976  February-April  8-12  7.7  -2.3 
1976 
October  1977  June 1977  7-11  9.3  +0.3 
September  1978  June 1978  6-10  5.1  -2.9 
December 1979  April-June 1979  5-9  5.9  -1.1 
February  1981  August-October  4-8  0.4  -5.6 
1980 
November 1982  M1 target withdrawn 
Notes:  Outcomes  are annualized  growth rates (%)  of seasonally  adjusted  M1 between the base period 
and the next announcement  of new targets,  for example,  the outcome  corresponding  to the November 
1975 announcement  is the annualized growth rate of M1 between May and June 1975 and August 
1976.  Outcome  less target  equals the outcome less the midpoint  of the target  range. 
Source:  OECD  Economic  Surveys  and Bank  of Canada  Review,  various  issues. 
caused  by  the  imposition  and  eventual  elimination  of wage  and  price 
controls. 
By 1978, only  3 years  after money  targeting  had begun,  the  Bank of 
Canada began  to  distance  itself  from  this  strategy.  A  dominant  factor 
was  concern  about  the  exchange  rate,  which  as  we  have  noted  had 
been  depreciating  (Fig.  5c).  Exchange  rate  worries  intensified  as  the 
U.S.  dollar began  its rapid appreciation  of the  early 1980s, threatening 
Canada  with  an  inflationary  shock  from  import  prices.  The  Bank  of 
Canada responded  by tightening  policy  more  than needed  to meet  the 
M1 targets; indeed,  M1 growth  was  negative  in  1981 even  though  the 
target range  was  for growth  between  4 and  8% (Fig.  lc  and  Table 3). 
Because  of their conflict  with  exchange  rate goals,  as well  as  ongoing 
money  demand  instability,  the  M1 targets were  canceled  in November 
1982. Canada thus  became  the only  country  examined  here to abandon 
formal money  growth  targeting  completely  in the early 1980s. 
The period  following  1982 was  one  of groping.  In 1984 the emphasis 
on  the  exchange  rate  (which  had  been  largely  unchanged  since  1978) 
was lessened,  so that the Bank of Canada could  attempt to assist recov- 
ery from the  very  deep  recession  that had  begun  in  1981. Unemploy- 
ment  did  fall after  1984 (Fig.  7c),  and  by  1988 the  Canadian  "misery 
index" (the inflation rate plus the unemployment  rate) was at its lowest 
point  in  many  years.  Still,  inflation  had  begun  to  edge  up  again,  to 
some  minds  threatening  a possible  return to the  1970s pattern. 
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in January 1988 Governor John Crow announced  that the Bank of Can- 
ada would  subsequently  pursue  an objective  of "price stability,"  that is 
literal elimination  of inflation.20 In February 1991 the Bank and the Min- 
ister of Finance jointly announced  a series of declining  inflation targets. 
Although  this  strategy  implied  that inflation  itself,  not money  growth, 
would  be the target of monetary  policy,  it was  indicated  that M2 would 
be  used  to  guide  policy.  (Attention  is  also  to  be  paid  to  an  index  of 
monetary  conditions  based  on  interest  rates and  exchange  rates.)  It is 
not completely  clear to what  degree  this new  commitment  to price sta- 
bility implies  abandonment  of  other  objectives,  but  it does  seem  that 
attention  to  those  other  goals  has  been  reduced:  For example,  during 
1987 through  1989,  the  Bank of  Canada  permitted  a much  greater in- 
crease  in  interest  rates  and  appreciation  of  the  currency  than  would 
have  normally  been  expected  under  previous  regimes. 
Germany.21  Germany's  central bank,  the Bundesbank,  also responded 
to rising inflation  in the early 1970s by adopting  a strategy  of targeting 
money  growth,  with  the  first  targets  being  announced  for  1975 (see 
Table 4). The monetary  aggregate  chosen  for targeting was central bank 
money  (denoted  as MO  in Figure ld),  the sum of currency in circulation 
and bank deposits  held by residents,  with  each category of bank depos- 
its weighted  by its 1974 required reserve ratios. As Fischer (1987) points 
out,  central bank money  can be interpreted  as approximating  the  "re- 
quired  monetary  base,"  and  for convenience,  we  label  it as  a narrow 
money  aggregate  in  Figure  ld.  However,  the  Bundesbank  has  noted 
that it views  central bank money  as a broad rather than narrow measure 
of money,  arguing that the required reserve ratio weights  are reasonable 
proxies for the relative liquidities  of the various  components. 
Monetary targets have been  announced  annually  and are reviewed  at 
midyear  in  light  of  macroeconomic  developments,  although  midyear 
revision  of targets  has been  extremely  unusual.  (The usual  function  of 
the midyear  review  is to use  interim  information  to reduce  the  size  of 
the  target  range.)  The  method  by  which  the  Bundesbank's  monetary 
targets are set is pFrticularly interesting:  The calculation of target ranges 
is  a  public  rather  than  a  clandestine  exercise.  The  setting  of  targets 
explicitly takes into account  the Bundesbank's  long-term  inflation  goal, 
estimated  potential  output  growth,  and expected  velocity  trends,  which 
20. As in a similar recent debate in the United  States, advocates  of "zero inflation" suggest 
that,  because  of difficulties  in  adjusting  for quality  change  and  other  index  number 
problems,  zero  inflation  may be  interpreted  as a small  positive  rate of measured  in- 
flation. 
21. This section  draws  on  Fischer  (1987),  Kahn and  Jacobson  (1989), von  Hagen  (1989), 
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Table  4  MONEY  GROWTH  TARGETS  AND OUTCOMES:  GERMANY 
Outcome 
Year  Aggregate  Target  Outcome  less target 
1975  CBM  8.0  9.8  +1.8 
1976  CBM  8.0  9.2  +1.2 
1977  CBM  8.0  9.0  +1.0 
1978  CBM  8.0  11.5  +3.5 
1979  CBM  6.0-9.0  6.4  -1.1 
1980  CBM  5.0-8.0  4.8  -1.7 
1981  CBM  4.0-7.0  3.6  -1.9 
1982  CBM  4.0-7.0  6.1  +0.6 
1983  CBM  4.0-7.0  7.0  +1.5 
1984  CBM  4.0-6.0  4.6  -0.4 
1985  CBM  3.0-5.0  4.5  +0.5 
1986  CBM  3.5-5.5  7.7  +3.2 
1987  CBM  3.0-6.0  8.0  +3.5 
1988  M3  3.0-6.0  6.8  +2.3 
1989  M3  5.0  4.7  -0.3 
1990  M3  4.0-6.01  5.5  +0.5 
1991  M3  4.0-6.02 
Notes:  Growth  rates are measured  year over year for 1975-1978  and fourth quarter  to fourth  quarter 
thereafter.  Outcome less target equals the outcome less the midpoint of the target range. CBM  is 
central  bank  money. 1The  target  was lowered to 3-5% in July.  2As of 1991,  targets  apply to all-German 
M3. 
Source:  Kahn  and Jacobson  (1989),  updates from OECD  Economic  Surveys,  various  issues. 
are combined  using  the  quantity-theory  equation  to determine  the  de- 
sired  money  growth  rate.  In theory,  this  explicit  linkage  of  targets  to 
goals has the important benefit  of allowing  targets to be adjusted  when 
the target-goal  relationship  changes,  without  compromising  the central 
bank's commitment  to meeting  its targets. 
"Short-term" considerations  such  as the unemployment  rate and ex- 
pected  transitory deviations  in inflation  or velocity  are not formally in- 
cluded  in the Bundesbank's  target-setting  exercise.  Nevertheless,  there 
is some  scope  for shorter-term considerations  to affect monetary  policy. 
For example,  the Bundesbank  freely acknowledges  that one  purpose  of 
specifying  target  ranges22 rather  than  single  numbers  is  to  give  itself 
some  scope  for short-run  discretionary  activism.  The size  of the target 
range has varied over time-it  was  zero in 1989-indicating  changes  in 
the amount  of short-term  flexibility  the Bundesbank  thinks  it needs. 
The  Bundesbank  has  also  shown  that  it is  willing  to  accept  money 
22. In 1975-1978  targets were  expressed  as single  numbers.  Since  1979 targets have been 
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growth  outside  of the target range for periods  of 2-3  years. In principle, 
deviations  of money  growth  from targets  are supposed  to be reversed 
subsequently,  so that short-term considerations  do not detract from the 
Bundesbank's  preeminent  goal  of low  and  stable  inflation  in  the  long 
run. Table 4 shows  that periods  of money  growth  over  target,  such  as 
1975-1978,  have  tended  to be followed  by periods  of slower  growth,  as 
in 1979-1981.  In general,  though,  Table 4 suggests  that the Bundesbank 
has not always  succeeded  in fully reversing  short-term deviations  from 
the money  growth  targets. 
Over the  last two  decades,  the  principal  object of short-term  discre- 
tionary policy by the Bundesbank  has been  the exchange  rate. In partic- 
ular, money  growth  targets were  exceeded  during  1975-1978  and again 
during 1986-1988 in order to dampen  an appreciating mark. The Bundes- 
bank's concern  about the exchange  rate has a number  of sources: First, 
under international  agreements  including  the European Exchange  Rate 
Mechanism,  the  Plaza Accord,  and  the  Louvre  Accord,  Germany  has 
accepted  some  responsibility  for  stabilizing  its  exchange  rate  within 
agreed-upon  ranges.  Second,  the large size of the German export sector 
makes the exchange  rate a politically  sensitive  variable. Finally, mainte- 
nance of a strong and stable mark is viewed  as a precondition  for achiev- 
ing inflation  goals. 
Central  bank  money  remained  the  money  target  through  1987.  In 
1988, the Bundesbank  adopted  simple-sum  M3 (the equal-weighted  sum 
of currency  in circulation,  demand  deposits,  time  deposits  less  than  4 
years,  and savings  deposits).  The rationale for the switch  was  that cen- 
tral bank money  put  too  much  weight  on  a rapidly  growing  currency 
component  and thus  overstated  monetary  ease-the  so-called  currency 
bias problem.  Despite  the  switch  in  targets,  Germany  has  not  experi- 
enced  nearly  as  much  instability  in  the  relationship  between  targeted 
aggregates  and  nominal  income  as have  a number  of the  other  major 
countries. 
In achieving  short-run  money  control,  the  Bundesbank  has  typically 
relied heavily on interest rate indicators (including  the call, or overnight, 
rate and the repurchase  rate), much in the spirit of the Federal Reserve's 
use of federal funds  rate targeting as a mechanism  for hitting monetary 
targets in  the  medium  term.  However,  while  the  Bundesbank  has  at- 
tempted  to keep  interest  rates  stable  in the  short  run,  it has  not  gone 
so far as to set  explicit  targets  for interest  rates (Batten et al.,  1990, p. 
11). It is  notable  that  the  Bundesbank  has  consistently  achieved  very 
low  variability of both  interest  rates (Fig. 4d) and  money  growth  rates 
(Fig. 2d),  contrary to the  simple  view  that suggests  a tradeoff between 
these  two  quantities. 
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low  and  stable  inflation  rate (Fig.  7d),  but,  unlike  Switzerland  and Ja- 
pan,  Germany has not avoided  a serious  and persistent  unemployment 
problem  (Fig. 7d). Fischer (1987) and  others  have  pointed  to inflexibili- 
ties in the  labor market (relative  to,  say,  Japan) as a potential  cause  of 
persistent  German unemployment. 
Most  recently,  the  reunification  of  Germany  has  posed  some  novel 
problems  for the Bundesbank.  The exchange  of West German currency 
for East German currency  at reunification  at rates favorable to the East 
has  created  nascent  inflationary  pressures,  at the  same  time  that  the 
tremendous  uncertainties  created  by  the  reunification  have  made  the 
forecasting  of  prosaic  items  like  velocity  quite  tricky.  In  addition, 
the political pressures  to support  strong  real growth  at the  early,  deli- 
cate stages  of reunification  are strong.  It remains  to be  seen  how  well 
the  Bundesbank's  traditional  policy  strategy  can  deal  with  this  new 
set of circumstances. 
Switzerland.23  The fixed-exchange-rate  regime ended  in Switzerland  in 
January 1973. The Swiss  National  Bank began to announce  money  stock 
targets,  with  M1 the  targeted  aggregate,  at the  end  of  1974.  Like the 
Germans, the Swiss  set money  growth  targets based on explicit inflation 
goals and forecasts of potential  output  and velocity  growth.  Announced 
targets were and have continued  to be single-valued  rather than ranges, 
a practice based  on  the interesting  rationale  that "from a psychological 
point  of  view,  missing  a  target  band  is  worse  than  missing  a  point 
target" (Schiltknecht,  1982, p.  73). 
An unusual  feature of the conduct  of Swiss  monetary  policy has been 
the Swiss  National  Bank's consistent  use  of the monetary  base  directly 
as  an  operating  instrument.  Control  of  M1  during  the  early  years  of 
targeting therefore  required the central bank to predict the value  of the 
money  multiplier  (the ratio of M1 to the base).  Perhaps  because  of the 
use  of the  monetary  base  as an instrument,  Switzerland  has  generally 
had higher  volatility  in short-term  interest  rates than  have  other coun- 
tries (Fig. 4). However,  this volatility  has not carried over to long-term 
rates, as Switzerland  has had the lowest  volatility  of long-term  interest 
rates of the  six countries  studied  here  (again  see  Fig. 4).  Presumably, 
the  low  volatility  of  long-term  rates  reflects  Switzerland's  success  at 
keeping  its inflation  rate low  and  stable in the longer  term. 
As in other countries,  the idea underlying  money  targeting in Switzer- 
land was  to reduce  money  growth  gradually  in order to eradicate infla- 
tion  over  the  longer  term.  However,  according  to  the  Director  of  the 
Swiss National Bank: ".  ..  the policy of well controlled,  stable monetary 
23. Historical discussions  of Swiss  monetary  policy  may be found  in Schiltknecht  (1982), 
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Table  5  MONEY  GROWTH  TARGETS  AND OUTCOMES:  SWITZERLAND 
Outcome 
Year  Aggregate  Target  Outcome  less target 
1975  M1  6  4.4  -1.1 
1976  M1  6  7.7  +1.7 
1977  M1  5  5.5  +0.5 
1978  M1  5  16.2  +11.2 
1979 
1980  MO  41  -0.61  -4.6 
1981  MO  4  -0.5  -4.5 
1982  MO  3  2.6  -0.4 
1983  MO  3  3.6  +0.6 
1984  MO  3  2.5  -0.5 
1985  MO  3  2.2  -0.8 
1986  MO  2  2.0  0.0 
1987  MO  2  3.0  +1.0 
1988  MO  3  -3.9  -6.9 
1989  MO  2  -4.9  -6.9 
1990  MO  2  -2.6  -4.6 
1991  MO  1  - 
Notes: Growth rates are measured  as mean  of monthly  year-on-year  growth  rates until 1988; after 1988 
growth  rates  are measured  fourth  quarter  to  fourth  quarter.  MO is  the  monetary  base  adjusted  to 
exclude  end-of-month  bulges  in  Swiss  National  Bank credit  to banks.  'Average  percentage  increase 
over the November  1979 level. 
Source:  Rich (1987), with  updates  from OECD Economic  Surveys, various  issues. 
growth was never viewed  as a policy which  should  be adhered to rigidly 
year after year,  or even  month  after month,  at all costs.  Rather, it was 
viewed  as  a medium-  to  long-term  constraint,  with  the  necessity  for 
short-run flexibility,  especially  in view  of exchange  rate developments" 
(Schiltknecht,  1982, p.  72). 
This approach to targets as a medium-  to long-term  constraint but not 
an impediment  to short-term discretion  is similar to the approach taken 
in Germany. Indeed,  in practice the Swiss have been even more success- 
ful  than  the  Germans  in  reversing  deviations  of  money  growth  from 
target: Between  1975 and  1986, the cumulative excess  of money  growth 
over target in Switzerland  (the sum of the "outcome  less target" column 
in Table 5) was  only  about  1.6%. 
An  example  of  short-run  monetary  "flexibility"  occurred  in  1978, 
when  the  Swiss  franc began  to  appreciate  (Fig.  5e).  In response,  the 
Bank eased  monetary  policy significantly:  M1 growth  in 1978 was above 
16% (Fig. le  and Table 5), compared  to a target of 5%. While rather an 
extreme  episode,  the  1978 actions  illustrate  the  general  willingness  of 
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short  run,  to  exchange  rate  considerations.  Swiss  concern  about  the 
exchange  rate reflects not only the extreme openness  of the Swiss  econ- 
omy,  but the fact that a stable franc is an important component  of Swit- 
zerland's  prominence  as an international  financial center. 
After  containment  of  the  1978 exchange  rate  emergency,  the  bank 
returned  to an (unannounced)  policy  of money  targeting  in the  spring 
of  1979.  However,  because  of  problems  with  forecasting  the  money 
multiplier,  beginning  in 1980 the monetary  base rather than M1 became 
the targeted  aggregate  (as well  as the policy  instrument). 
In 1980 and 1981 money  growth was low and below  target, in reaction 
to  increased  inflation  and  the  overshooting  of  money  targets  in  the 
previous  few  years.  The period  from  1982 to about  1987, though,  was 
remarkably halcyon:  Money  growth  targets  were  routinely  met  (Table 
5). The short-term volatility  of Swiss  money  growth  remained  compara- 
tively  high  (Fig.  2),  however,  implying  that  the  Swiss  were  acting 
quickly to offset  high-frequency  deviations  of money  growth  from tar- 
get.  Inflation  fell to low  levels  (Fig. 6e),  and  unemployment  remained 
insignificant  (Fig. 7e).24 Monetary  policy was  assisted  considerably  dur- 
ing the early 1980s by the fact that the link between  money  growth  and 
nominal  magnitudes  in Switzerland  appeared  stable,  despite  transient 
velocity  fluctuations. 
In 1986 there was  a significant  decline  in the inflation rate (from over 
3% almost to zero) and in 1989 a sharp increase  in inflation  (from about 
2% to  nearly  5%), neither  of  which  was  predicted  by  the  behavior  of 
the  monetary  base  (see  Yue  and  Fluri,  1991,  for a discussion).  Swiss 
central bankers have  suggested  that the problem is a structural break in 
the  demand  for base  money,  brought  about  by  the  introduction  of an 
electronic  interbank  payments  system  and  a reduction  in legal  reserve 
requirements.  In attempting  to offset  this  fall in base  money  demand, 
the Swiss  National  Bank permitted  negative  money  growth  for 3 years 
(Table 5).  The  instability  in  the  demand  for base  money  has  led  the 
Swiss  National  Bank  to  deemphasize  money  base  targeting  and,  re- 
cently,  to contemplate  fundamental  changes  in its monetary  strategy. 
Japan.25  The increase  in oil prices  in late  1973 was  a major shock  for 
Japan, with  substantial  adverse  effects  on  inflation,  economic  growth, 
and the government's  budget.  In response  to an increase in the inflation 
24. However,  the  Swiss  reliance  on  "guest  workers,"  who  are  repatriated  when  labor 
market  conditions  worsen,  makes  Swiss  unemployment  data  more  difficult  to  in- 
terpret. 
25. Among  the many  useful  general  sources  on Japanese  monetary  policy are Cargill and 
Hutchison  (1987), Dotsey  (1986), Hutchison  (1988), Batten et al.  (1990), Kasman and 
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rate to a level  above 20% in 1974 (Fig. 6f)-a  surge facilitated by money 
growth  in  1973 in excess  of 20% (Fig.  lf)-the  Bank of Japan, like the 
other  central banks  we  have  considered,  began  to pay  more  attention 
to money  growth  rates. In 1978 the Bank began to announce  "forecasts" 
at the beginning  of each quarter for the growth  rate of M2 (changed  to 
the growth  rate of M2  +  CDs when  CDs were introduced  in 1979) from 
1 year earlier to the current quarter (Table 6). 
The use  of the word forecast rather than target suggests  that the Bank 
of Japan was  committed  only  to monitoring  rather than  to controlling 
money  growth.26 However,  after 1978 there did appear to be a substan- 
tive change  in policy  strategy,  in the  direction  of being  more  "money- 
focused."  Particularly striking  was  the  different  response  of monetary 
policy  to  the  second  oil  price  shock  in  1979: Instead  of  allowing  ex- 
tremely  high  money  growth,  as  occurred  in  1973,  the  Bank of Japan 
quickly reduced  M2  +  CDs growth  in 1979 and 1980 to quite a low level 
(Fig.  lf).  The  difference  in  the  inflation  outcome  in  this  episode  was 
also  striking,  as  inflation  increased  only  moderately  with  no  adverse 
effects  on  the  unemployment  situation.  More  generally,  the  Bank of 
Japan's forecasts  and  actual money  growth  followed  a declining  trend 
into the mid-1980s  (except in 1981; see Table 6). Thus,  in contrast to the 
German and Swiss  practice of clearly specifying  central bank intentions 
in  advance,  the  Japanese  seemed  to  follow  an  "actions  speak  louder 
than words"  approach.  As we  discuss  further later, however,  in recent 
years  both  forecasts  and  actual  money  growth  in Japan have  become 
much more variable, weakening  the presumption  that the Bank of Japan 
practices "closet  monetarism." 
From an  institutional  point  of  view,  it was  no  doubt  fortunate  that 
the  Bank of  Japan began  to  focus  on  money  at  the  time  that  it  did. 
Traditionally, Japanese  central bank policy  had emphasized  the control 
of bank credit,  which  proved  an effective  instrument  in a highly  regu- 
lated financial environment  in which  borrowers  had few  substitutes  for 
bank  loans.  However,  a  slow  but  steady  process  of  liberalization  of 
financial markets began  around  1975, resulting  ultimately  in the  intro- 
duction  of  new  financial  instruments  and  markets  and  a  weaker  tie 
between  bank lending  and  economic  activity.27 
In a financial environment  that over time has become  more and more 
similar to  that  of  the  United  States,  the  Bank  of Japan's  methods  of 
conducting  monetary  policy  have  also  evolved  in  the  direction  of  the 
26. Much has been written on whether and to what degree the Bank  of Japan  implicitly 
targets money growth. See, e.g., Hutchison (1986),  Ito (1989),  and Ueda (1991). 
27. Kasman  and Rodrigues (1991) provide an excellent discussion of Japanese financial 
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Table  6  MONEY  GROWTH  TARGETS  AND OUTCOMES:  JAPAN 
Outcome 
Year  Aggregate  Target1  Outcome  less target 
1978  M2  12-13  12.6  +0.1 
1979  M2 +  CD  11  10.3  -0.7 
1980  M2 +  CD  8  7.6  -0.4 
1981  M2 +  CD  10  10.4  +0.4 
1982  M2 +  CD  8  8.3  +0.3 
1983  M2 +  CD  7  6.8  -0.2 
1984  M2 +  CD  8  7.9  -0.1 
1985  M2 +  CD  8  9.0  +1.0 
1986  M2 +  CD  8-9  8.3  -0.2 
1987  M2 +  CD  11-12  11.8  +0.3 
1988  M2 +  CD  10-11  10.6  +0.1 
1989  M2 +  CD  10-11  10.6  +0.1 
1990  M2 +  CD  ca. 11  10.0  -1.0 
1991  M2 +  CD  ca. 4 
Notes:  Growth rates are measured fourth quarter  to fourth quarter.  Outcome less target equals the 
outcome  less the midpoint  of the target  range. 'Announced at the beginning  of the fourth  quarter  and 
are referred  to as forecasts  rather  than targets  by the Bank  of Japan. 
Source:  Fischer  (1987)  and Bank  for International  Settlements,  Annual  Report,  various  issues. 
U.S.  example.28 Abandoning  quantitative  credit  controls,  the  Bank of 
Japan has moved  gradually to a system  emphasizing  open-market  oper- 
ations in the interbank market,29 more attention  to money  growth,  and 
the use  of interbank interest  rates as the primary instruments  of mone- 
tary control.  However,  unlike  the United  States, Japan has always  used 
interest rate instruments  of some  type and has never experimented  with 
the  targeting  of bank reserves.  The outcome  of these  operating  proce- 
dures  is that the volatility  of interest  rates in Japan has  generally  been 
low in relation to other countries  (Fig. 4), while  the volatility  of the M2 
+  CDs aggregate  focused  on by the Bank of Japan has been comparable 
to the volatility  of U.S.  M2 (Fig. 2). 
Also  in parallel to the  United  States,  ultimately  financial  innovation 
and deregulation  in Japan began  to reduce  the usefulness  of the broad 
money  target: In particular,  introduction  of  money  market  certificates 
and  large  time  deposits  in  1985,  and  the  repeated  reductions  in  the 
minimum  denominations  of  these  assets  over  1986-1989,  led  to  in- 
28. The  similarity  of Japanese  and  American  central  bank  operating  procedures  is  dis- 
cussed by Dotsey (1986). 
29. Open-market  operations  are  supplemented  by  discount  window  lending,  as  in  the 
United  States.  Unlike  the  United  States,  in  Japan open-market  operations  are con- 
ducted in a number of other financial markets,  including  the CD market and (recently) 
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creases in the demand  for M2 (see,  e.g.,  Yoshida  and Rasche,  1990). In 
response  to  increased  money  demand,  and  also  because  of  concern 
about appreciation  of the yen,  the Bank of Japan significantly  increased 
the rate of money  growth  in 1987-1989  (Table 6). 
Beginning  in 1989, monetary  policy became  oriented  toward trying to 
arrest what  many  Japanese  policymakers  considered  to be a bubble  in 
land  and  stock  prices,  without  causing  a crash that might  have  disas- 
trous  financial  consequences.  Asset  prices  did  come  down  as  money 
growth  slowed,  but  economic  activity  weakened  also.  Another  factor 
that has recently complicated  monetary  policy is a slowdown  in lending 
by Japanese banks associated  with  the increase  in bank capital require- 
ments  mandated  by the  Basle Accord.  In responding  to these  develop- 
ments,  as  we  have  mentioned,  the  Bank  of  Japan  has  permitted  a 
considerable  increase  in  the  variability  of  broad  money  growth  since 
late 1990 (Fig. 2f), and in general  has engaged  in a much  more "discre- 
tionary" style  of policy-making. 
3. Conduct  of Monetary  Policy  in Six Countries: 
Some  Positive  Hypotheses 
What do we  learn from these  case  studies  of monetary  policy-making? 
In this section,  we  discuss  some  positive  hypotheses,  so called because 
they  seem  to  apply  generally  across  the  case  studies.  We  state  these 
hypotheses  as  if  they  were  conclusions  but  remind  the  reader  once 
again that they (as well as the more normative observations  discussed  in 
Section  4) are intended  only  as propositions  worthy  of further exami- 
nation. 
(1) Central bankers  have multiple objectives  and a "crisis mentality." It is a 
commonplace  that  central  bankers  care about  both  economic  growth 
and inflation,  which  may force them  to confront  difficult tradeoffs.  But 
the behavior  of central bankers  suggests  that other variables enter their 
objective function  as well.  The leading  example  from the case studies  is 
the  nominal  exchange  rate: In all six  cases  examined,  central bankers 
modified  their  policies  in  order  to  arrest what  they  considered  to  be 
undesirable  exchange  rate  trends.  Arguably,  in  some  of  these  cases 
(when  the  United  Kingdom  "capped"  the  pound  in 1987, e.g.)  the ex- 
change rate played  the role of an intermediate  target, that is, the central 
bank's  intervention  reflected  concern  not  about  the  exchange  rate per 
se but about what  the exchange  rate was  signalling  about the stance  of 
monetary  policy.  However,  in  many  of  the  cases,  the  exchange  rate 
clearly functioned  as a goal  of policy,  reflecting  central bank concerns 
about  the  health  of  the  traded  goods  sector  or international  commit- 
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Interest  rate  stability  has  also  in  many  cases  been  an  independent 
objective of policy.  For example,  in the 1970s the Federal Reserve chose 
to tolerate high rates of money  growth  in order to avoid sharp increases 
in interest rates (a policy that was dramatically reversed  in 1979). Japan, 
Germany,  and to some  extent  Great Britain have  all attempted  to keep 
interest rate volatility low even  as the economic  environment  and mone- 
tary policy strategies  have changed  (Fig. 4). Several writers (e.g.,  Good- 
friend,  1987; Howitt,  forthcoming)  have  suggested  that  central banks 
view  interest  rate  stability  as  important  for  maintaining  "orderly"  fi- 
nancial markets free from excessive  speculation. 
Although  they have  multiple  objectives,  over time central bankers do 
not  devote  constant  proportions  of  their  attention  to  each  objective. 
Rather, at any given  time, the lion's share of the central bank's attention 
is typically  devoted  to the  one  or two  objectives  that are furthest  from 
desired  levels.  A possible  explanation  of this  "crisis mentality"  is that 
the  marginal  social  cost  of,  say,  high  inflation  really  does  increase 
sharply  with  the  inflation  rate. Alternatively,  central bankers  may feel 
that their independence  and perquisites  are threatened  more by a public 
perception  that some  aspect  of the economy  is "out of control" than by 
a record of generally  mediocre  performance. 
The fact that central banks  have  multiple  objectives  creates  obvious 
tensions  in  the  monetary  policy  process.  For example,  as  Goodfriend 
(1987) has  pointed  out,  the  preference  of  the  central  bank  for  main- 
taining  a  stable  nominal  interest  rate  may  lead  to  nonstationarity  in 
money  and prices.  Multiplicity  of objectives  and the crisis mentality  can 
also make even  the most competent  and purposeful  central bank appear 
at best  to be  muddling  through,  or at worst  to be  lurching  from  one 
strategy to another.  As we  discuss  further later, the complexity  of cen- 
tral bank objectives  and behavior  may increase  the value  of clear com- 
munication  with  the  public  about  the  goals  and  direction  of monetary 
policy. 
(2) The  greater is the central bank's  concern  about inflation, the stronger will 
be its tendency to employ monetary  aggregates  as intermediate  targets. All six 
of the countries  discussed  here adopted  monetary  targeting in the 1970s 
in  response  to  a  worldwide  increase  in  inflation  and  persisted  with 
money  targets until disinflation  was  achieved.30 The central banks most 
"hawkish"  on  inflation,  such  as  those  of  Germany  and  Switzerland, 
30. This statement requires that we  interpret the Japanese "forecasts"  as indicating a 
targeting strategy. It should also be noted that several central banks (notably the 
United States  and United Kingdom)  initially  adopted money targets  only under some 
external  pressure;  in both the U.S. and British  cases, however, the seriousness with 
which money targets were treated increased markedly when the second oil shock 
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have  been  the  most  consistent  in maintaining  a money  targeting  strat- 
egy,  while  more "dovish"  monetary  authorities  like those  of the United 
Kingdom,  Canada  (before  1988), and  the  United  States  have  been  the 
least consistent. 
The  natural  first place  to  look  for an  explanation  for this  aspect  of 
central  bank  behavior  is  Poole's  (1970)  well-known  theory  of  target 
choice,  which  argues  essentially  that  the  optimal  intermediate  target 
is  the  one  with  the  most  stable  relationship  with  the  goal  variables. 
Unfortunately,  Poole's  model  is of limited help in this instance,  because 
it predicts that money  targets will be preferred over interest rate targets 
during  periods  when  money  demand  is relatively  stable.  What we  ob- 
serve  is the  reverse:  In the  halcyon  pre-1974 days  of stable money  de- 
mand,  central banks  were  more  likely  to focus  on interest  rate targets, 
while  in  many  countries,  the  switch  to  money  targets  occurred  and 
persisted  during  a period  of severe  velocity  instability.  Further, central 
bankers have  typically  reacted to unstable  velocities  not by reverting to 
interest  rate targeting  but instead  by changing  the particular monetary 
aggregate that they target-in  some  cases  switching  from a narrower to 
a broad  aggregate  (the  United  States,  Germany)  and  in  others  from a 
broader  aggregate  to  a  narrower  one  (the  United  Kingdom,  Swit- 
zerland). 
Why then  do central banks  adopt  money  growth  targets when  faced 
with  inflationary  crises? The next two  points  discuss  possible  reasons. 
(3) One  function of an intermediate  target  such as money  growth, as perceived 
by central bankers, is to act as a guidepost or compass for monetary policy. 
Central bankers  face  considerable  uncertainty  not  only  with  regard to 
the  state  of  the  economy  and  the  nature  and  timing  of  the  monetary 
transmission  mechanism,  but  also  about  the  stance  of policy  itself.  In 
pursuing  intermediate  targets,  the  policymakers  hope  to improve  their 
measurement  of their policy  stance  and,  thus,  reduce the probability of 
inadvertently  choosing  the wrong  settings  for their instruments.  Thus, 
the adoption  of money  growth  targets in the late 1970s by many central 
banks was  intended  to help  avoid  the  overexpansionary  tendencies  of 
the  earlier part of the  decade.  In particular,  it was  hoped  that money 
growth  would  prove  a more  reliable  indicator  of monetary  conditions 
than variables  that had  been  employed  earlier,  such  as interest  rates31 
and free reserves. 
The use  of monetary  aggregates  as guideposts  has been  problematic 
31. One might construct  an argument on Poole-like grounds that nominal interest rates 
are  a bad target  during  periods  of unstable  inflation,  because  high nominal  interest 
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in practice,  however,  and  for some  of the  same  reasons  suggested  by 
Poole's  original  analysis:  The  relationship  between  individual  aggre- 
gates and macroeconomic  variables has often been  unstable,  and differ- 
ent aggregates  have  as often as not given  conflicting  information,  as for 
example  in the United  Kingdom  in the 1979-1982  period  when  narrow 
and broad  aggregates  gave  very  different  readings  of  the  tightness  of 
policy. 
There is still a deeper  question  about the use  of monetary  aggregates 
as guideposts,  however,  which  also follows  from the logic of the  Poole 
model:  If the  central  bank  is  searching  for a  guidepost  for  monetary 
policy,  why  confine  the  search to one  or two  economic  variables? Why 
not instead  use  a forecast  that optimally  weights  all available informa- 
tion  about  the  likely  effects  of policy  on  the  economy?  As  we  discuss 
further below,  the answer  to this question  may be that there is a comple- 
mentarity  between  using  a  money  growth  target  as  a  guidepost  and 
using  it as a signal  to the public  about monetary  policy  intentions. 
(4) The  second  and probably  more  important  reason  that central  bankers  adopt 
money growth targets is  to signal the central bank's goals and intentions- 
particularly  those concerning inflation-to  the public. Both central bankers 
and  the  public  consider  the  control  of inflation  to be  one  of  the  most 
important  objectives  of  monetary  policy.  Yet  of  central  banks'  many 
objectives,  inflation is perhaps  the one related to policy actions with  the 
longest  lag. Thus,  it is particularly difficult for the public to evaluate  the 
inflationary impact of current policies.  An advantage  of money  targeting 
is that-because  of the  simple  and  widely  understood  quantity-theory 
prediction  that  money  growth  and  inflation  will  be  proportional- 
money  growth  targets may be perceived  as being  informative  about the 
central bank's  goals  and intentions  with  respect  to inflation.32 
Central bankers see several  potential  benefits  to using  money  growth 
targets to signal  medium-  and long-term  inflation  strategy.  One  poten- 
tial benefit is that explicit targets for money  growth may aid the manage- 
ment  of inflationary  expectations.  If the  central bank  can reassure  the 
public through  a targeting  procedure  that it is committed  to controlling 
inflation  in  the  longer  run,  it  may  reduce  financial  market  volatility 
and conceivably  (although  we  have  no evidence  on this point) improve 
short-run policy  tradeoffs. 
Another  potential  benefit  to the  central bank of emphasizing  money 
growth  targets  is  that  this  practice  keeps  the  central  bank's  inflation 
32. The empirical  fact of velocity instability  implies, of course, that the relationship  be- 
tween money growth and inflation is really not so simple. We return  to this issue in 
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objectives  "on the  front burner"  and  makes  the  central bank more  ac- 
countable  to  the  public  for keeping  inflation  low.  Theories  of bureau- 
cratic behavior  might  seem  to  imply  that  a bureaucracy  like  a central 
bank will want  to avoid  accountability.  But in fact, a central bank may 
want  to  make  itself  more  accountable  for achieving  price  stability  be- 
cause  it values  the  price  stability  goal  more  than  do  politicians  in  the 
legislative  and executive  branches.33 For example,  if the central bank is 
able to point to money  growth  above target (with its implied inflationary 
consequences),  it may be able to enlist public support  in resisting  politi- 
cal pressures  for excessive  short-run  expansion.  Elements  of this strat- 
egy  can be seen  in almost  all the major disinflations  of the early 1980s, 
in which  central bankers emphasized  the importance  of meeting  money 
growth  targets in order to deflect  political demands  for rapid reflation. 
The  notion  that  central  banks  seek  to  bind  their  own  hands  is  of 
course  closely  related  to  Kydland  and  Prescott's  (1977) seminal  argu- 
ment for rules,  with  the difference  that we  here emphasize  an intragov- 
ernmental  variant  of  Kydland  and  Prescott's  precommitment  game. 
However,  as the next point  emphasizes,  in practice central bankers re- 
ject the notion  of rigid rules in favor of looser  types  of precommitment. 
(5) Central  banks  never  and nowhere  adhere  to strict, ironclad  rules  for mone- 
tary growth. Central  banks'  attachments  to specific  targets  for specific  monetary 
aggregates is at best modest and is alwyas hostage to new developments  in the 
economy. As is evident  from the case  studies  and Tables 1-6,  all central 
banks deviate  significantly  from their monetary  targets to pursue  short- 
term  objectives,  and  are  most  explicit  about  their  willingness  to  be 
"flexible"  and  "pragmatic"  in  the  short  run.  Further,  money  growth 
targets and  the  targeted  aggregates  themselves  may  be  changed  fairly 
often. 
Clearly, central banks have  never taken seriously  the literal "precom- 
mitment  through  rules"  strategy  implied  by  Kydland  and  Prescott's 
analysis  of the time inconsistency  problems.  If money  growth  rules are 
adopted  at all, they are intended  to apply  only in the medium  and long 
33. Differences  in the horizons of politicians  and central  bankers are sufficient to create 
this difference  in preferences.  For  example, as suggested by work of Rogoff  and Sibert 
(1988),  in order  to signal their  economic  competence,  politicians  may have an incentive 
to create  an inflationary  boom prior to an election. If the central  banker  is not up for 
re-election  and fears that the central bank will be blamed for long-run increases in 
inflation, he will resist political  demands for preelection  increases in money growth. 
In a Rogoff-Sibert-style  game, all the central  banker  needs to do to diffuse the pressure 
from the politicians  is to give the public full information  about monetary  policy-for 
example, announce the money growth targets  consistent with noninflationary  growth 
-thereby  ensuring that the politicians  receive no credit for output increases arising 
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term.  Of course,  as it has been  said,  the long  term is just a succession 
of short terms. Thus,  for a longer-term  money  growth target to be mean- 
ingful,  the central bank must  at some  point  demonstrate  its willingness 
to  offset  short-term  deviations  from  the  target  path.34 The  feasibility 
and value  of "hybrid" strategies,  containing  elements  of both rules and 
discretion,  is discussed  further in the next  section. 
4. What  Works?  Some  Normative  Hypotheses  and Issues  for 
Future  Research 
The case studies  showed  that, although  national experiences  with mon- 
etary policy  in  the  last  two  decades  are diverse,  a dominant  theme  is 
the  adoption  of money  targeting  strategies  as  a response  to increased 
inflation.  In the  last  section  we  argued  that  central  bankers  adopted 
money  growth  targets  for two  reasons:  as guideposts,  helping  them  to 
measure  policy  stance; and as signals,  communicating  to the public the 
medium-term  goals  of policy.  Despite  what  was  to some  degree  a com- 
mon  approach  to monetary  policy,  however,  some  central banks  have 
fared much  better  than  others  in  meeting  their  ultimate  policy  objec- 
tives,  particularly in achieving  low  and  stable inflation. 
Why  have  some  central  banks  been  more  successful  in  their  use  of 
money  growth  targets? The case  studies  provide  some  clues  that may 
help  answer  this  question.  We list some  hypotheses  suggested  by the 
case  studies  that we  view  as being  worth  serious  exploration  in future 
research. 
(1) Successful use of money growth targets in conducting monetary policy 
seems to require  that the central bank  does not "play  games" with its targeting 
procedures.  A  major reason  for using  money  growth  targets,  we  have 
seen,  is to communicate  with  the public.  Hence,  clarity, openness,  and 
consistency  in the targeting  procedure  are potentially  almost  as impor- 
tant as whether  the  targets  are met.  Central bank actions  that increase 
the clarity of its policies  include:  targeting  only one aggregate  at a time, 
announcing  targets on a regular schedule  for a specified  horizon,  being 
as consistent  as possible  in the  choice  of aggregate  to be targeted,  and 
34. The basic Kydland-Prescott (1977) analysis suggests that central bank promises to 
meet money growth targets in the long run but not the short run would never be 
credible. However, this conclusion is dependent on the assumption that the central 
bank values unemployment below the natural  rate. If the central  bank does not view 
its mandate as reducing unemployment, or is content with unemployment at the 
natural  rate, then it may be possible to make credible  promises about future money 
growth. Further,  the central  bank may be able to develop a reputation  for meeting its 
medium-term  targets;  see Rogoff (1987)  for a comprehensive  discussion of reputation 
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giving  clear  explanations  of  the  reason  for  and  expected  duration  of 
deviations  of money  growth  from target. 
A particularly interesting  way  in which  central banks can clarify their 
intentions  is by means  of a public calculation of target ranges that makes 
explicit  the  central  bank's  goals  and  its  assumptions  about  how  the 
target is tied to those  goals.  In principle,  this explicit linkage  of targets 
to goals  might  have  the  important  benefit  of allowing  the central bank 
to adjust its targets when  the target-goal  relationship  changes,  without 
compromising  its credibility. 
Generally,  Germany  and  Switzerland  did  well  on  the  above  criteria 
over the last two decades,  while  the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and  Canada  did  less  well.  The  most  egregious  game-player  was  the 
Bank of  England,  with  its  multiple  targeted  aggregates,  extreme  base 
drift, erratic changes  in targets and target horizons,  and its use of artifi- 
cial means  (the corset) to bring down  the growth of a targeted aggregate. 
The  U.S.  Fed  and  the  Bank of  Canada  also  did  not  take their  targets 
very  seriously,  at least  at first,  as evidenced  by the  Fed's multiple  tar- 
gets  and  base  drift and  the  Bank of  Canada's  practice of  announcing 
targets  irregularly  for  horizons  that  were  not  clearly  specified.35 Im- 
proved  inflation performance  in a number  of the countries  studied  here 
coincided  with  the  adoption  of  more  serious  and  straightforward  tar- 
geting procedures.  The clearest example is Britain, which achieved  more 
stable inflation  after it abandoned  the corset and multiple  targets to fo- 
cus on a regularly announced  target for a single  aggregate. 
Japan is  an  interesting  intermediate  case,  in  that  it has  had  a very 
successful  monetary  policy  despite  the opacity  of its targeting  (or non- 
targeting) procedure.36 On the other hand,  Japan is the only country  to 
have  focused  on  a  single  monetary  aggregate  (M2  +  CDs)  over  the 
entire period; it has announced  its money  growth  "forecasts" on a con- 
sistent  and regular basis; and it achieved  a relatively  steady  slowdown 
of  money  growth  between  the  mid-1970s  and  mid-1980s,  despite  the 
occurrence  of  a  second  oil  shock  in  1979.  Thus-at  least  prior  to  its 
recent switch  to a more discretionary  mode-the  Bank of Japan created 
a degree  of predictability  about its medium-term  policies. 
From the perspective  of the literature on central bank credibility,  it is 
not surprising  that game-playing  in targeting  procedures-which  leads 
the public to believe  the central bank is not serious-is  counterproduc- 
tive.  A  straightforward  approach  to  conducting  monetary  policy  ap- 
35. We should be careful  of attributing  the relatively  less good performance  of Canadian 
monetary  policy solely to such game-playing,  however; as we have noted, the degree 
to which Canadian  monetary  policy is independent from U.S. policy is problematic. 
36. At least it is opaque to U.S. academics.  Perhaps  it is clearer  to Japanese  business and 
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pears to be quite useful  for increasing  the central bank's credibility and 
improving  policy  outcomes. 
(2) Short-run adherence  to money growth targets may not be necessary  for 
the successful  use of a money targeting strategy as long as there  is some commit- 
ment by the central  bank  to reverse  deviations  of money  growth  from target  over 
the longer term. As the example  of Switzerland  most clearly illustrates,  a 
money  targeting  strategy  apparently  can be  used  successfully  even  if 
money  growth  rates have  large fluctuations  and are frequently  outside 
of  target  ranges.  However,  the  success  of  Swiss  monetary  policy  in 
keeping  inflation  low  seems  to  have  required  a  commitment  by  the 
Swiss  National  Bank to compensate  for high  rates of money  growth  in 
one  period  by subsequent  offsetting  low  rates of money  growth  in fu- 
ture periods.  In other  words,  it looks  as if the  Swiss  have  successfully 
used  a hybrid  strategy,  in which  rules  are used  to guide  policy  in the 
long  term but not in the  short term.  The German and Japanese  central 
banks  have  similarly  demonstrated  their  willingness  to  make  up  for 
periods  of  excessive  money  growth  by  subsequent  periods  of  slow 
money  growth,  although  to  a lesser  extent  than  the  Swiss.  Again  the 
worst  record belongs  to the  British, who  consistently  missed  targets in 
the same direction. 
A  cynic  might  ask,  "What is  the  difference  between  a policy  of  re- 
versing  deviations  from target and  the  highly  criticized  'stop-go'  poli- 
cies  of  the  1960s  and  early  1970s,  which  also  involved  alternating 
periods  of low  and  high  money  growth?"  The difference,  which  is ad- 
mittedly  subtle,  is  that  the  policy  of  reversing  deviations  from  target 
takes place in a larger framework,  one that provides  a basis for expecting 
that short-term expansions  or reductions  in money  growth  will be sub- 
sequently  offset.  In contrast,  although  the earlier regime  sometimes  in- 
volved  reversals ex post (stop-go  policies),  there was no basis for people 
to  expect  ex  ante  that  such  reversals  would  occur.  Thus-as  again  is 
consistent  with the literature on credibility-it  is the nature of the expec- 
tation engendered  by a policy  that appears  to be critical to its success. 
Complementary  to a strategy  of reversing  short-term deviations  from 
target is a policy  of adjusting  targets when  their relationship  with  goal 
variables changes,  as is practiced (in principle at least) by Germany and 
Switzerland.  It would  not  be  desirable  to offset  a deviation  in  money 
growth  arising from a permanent  shock to velocity,  for example.  Under 
the  German-Swiss  method  of  setting  targets,  a  permanent  shock  to 
velocity  would  result  in  a change  in  the  money  growth  target.  In an 
unconditional  money  targeting  scheme,  by  contrast,  the  central bank 
could  accommodate  the  velocity  shock  only  by  sacrificing  its  commit- 
ment  to the target. 
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details of the operating  procedure  or the choice  of instruments. A wide  variety 
of operating procedures  has been observed  across the six countries stud- 
ied here,  but there is no evident  correlation between  the type  of proce- 
dure  and  the  effectiveness  of monetary  policy.  For example,  the  most 
common  procedure-using  the interbank interest rate as an instrument 
for achieving  medium-term  targets for money  growth-seemed  to work 
poorly  for the  United  States  in the  1970s but has been  used  quite  suc- 
cessfully  by Japan and Germany. 
In addition,  as a comparison  of operating  procedures  between  Swit- 
zerland  and  Germany  indicates,  focus  on  a monetary  aggregate  as an 
operating  instrument  does  not  guarantee  a more  successful  adherence 
to monetary targets. Indeed,  Switzerland  (which has used  the monetary 
base as its operating  instrument)  has had among  the most variable rates 
of money  growth,  while  Germany (which employs  an interbank interest 
rate as its instrument)  has had among  the lowest  money  growth variabil- 
ity (Fig. 2). It is also interesting  that, although  the Swiss  operating  pro- 
cedure has resulted  in high  volatility  of short-term interest  rates, Swiss 
long-term rates have shown  less volatility than in any of the other coun- 
tries studied  here (Fig. 4). Because it is the volatility of long-term interest 
rates  that  would  seem  to  be  the  more  relevant  to  the  stability  of  the 
financial system,  the Swiss  example  suggests  that the use  of the mone- 
tary base  as  an  operating  instrument  need  not  create  problems  even 
with  respect  to the goal of interest  rate smoothing. 
This irrelevance  of the  operating  procedure  is not  surprising  from a 
theoretical  viewpoint,  because  any  of  a number  of  procedures  can be 
used  to  achieve  any  given  set  of  values  for the  central bank's  targets 
and goals-and  it is the latter that should  matter for the macroeconomy. 
If operating  procedures  are macroeconomically  unimportant,  why  then 
do  central banks  pay  so  much  attention  to them?  The  "smokescreen" 
argument may be relevant here. For example,  by focusing  on the change 
in operating  procedure  in  1979, Fed Chairman Volcker partly diverted 
attention  from  a more  fundamental  change  in  policy.  Also,  the  Swiss 
example notwithstanding,  the details of operating  procedures  may have 
important effects on certain segments  of financial markets (banks, bond 
traders) which  the central bank considers  to be an important  part of its 
clientele. 
Although  these  observations  about  what  works  well  in  promoting 
successful  monetary  policy  are suggestive,  further research  on  several 
problematic points  is needed. 
A first troublesome  issue  turns on the nature of the empirical relation- 
ship between  money  and other economic  variables.  Our review  of cen- 
tral banks' experience  suggests  that money  growth  targeting,  if treated 
as  a flexible  constraint  on  medium-term  policy,  can  be  a useful  tool. Central  Bank  Behavior  and the Strategy  of Monetary  Policy  ?  217 
However,  even  the best-handled  money  targeting strategy requires that 
there be some  predictable  relationship  between  money  growth  and the 
goal variables of policy; it has been  argued  (most persuasively  by Fried- 
man  and  Kuttner,  1990) that the  relationship  between  money  and  the 
economy  is empirically  so unstable  that monetary  aggregates  are of es- 
sentially  no value  in guiding  monetary  policy.  Isn't this instability  fatal 
to the case for any type  of money  targeting? 
This issue  is of first-order importance  and needs  further investigation 
in a cross-national  context.  Several responses  can be made at this point, 
however: 
First, it is  possible  that  the  velocity  instability  that has  plagued  the 
monetary  policy  of countries  such  as the United  States and the United 
Kingdom  is itself  partly endogenous,  a result  of erratic monetary  poli- 
cies  that have  created  highly  variable inflation  and  interest  rates.  Our 
case  studies  show  that  countries  with  more  stable  monetary  policies, 
while  not immune  to velocity  instability,  do  suffer from it to a smaller 
degree.  In particular, Japan's  ability  to  provide  monetary  stability  de- 
spite major changes  in its financial institutions  is striking. Thus,  longer- 
run  money  growth  targeting  might  also  lead  to  a  more  stable  rela- 
tionship  of money  to other variables. 
Second,  as we  have  already  discussed,  there  are reasons  to believe 
that  the  German-Swiss  technique  of  adjusting  money  growth  targets 
for expected  changes  in velocity  is preferable  to unconditional  money 
growth  targeting.  If  adjustments  for  expected  velocity  changes  are 
made, then stability of velocity  is not a prerequisite for successful  policy, 
only  some  degree  of conditional  predictability  of velocity.  Of course,  it 
may be that even  conditional  prediction  is not possible;  empirical work 
should  be directed  toward  finding  out. 
A third response  that can be made to the Friedman-Kuttner  objection 
is  that  it  does  appear  to  be  useful  to  central  bankers  to  have  some 
variable  or variables  to  signal  the  medium-term  stance  of  policy;  for 
reasons  of both theory and simplicity,  money  growth  is a natural candi- 
date. However,  if velocity  unpredictability  disqualifies  money  as an ap- 
propriate target-as  might  have  been  the case in the United  States and 
Britain during  1979-1982,  for example-then  one  would  want  to con- 
sider alternative  anchors  for policy,  such as the exchange  rate, nominal 
GNP,  or  inflation  forecasts.  Unfortunately,  as  a  large  literature  dis- 
cusses,  the  obvious  alternatives  to money  growth  also  have  shortcom- 
ings,  including  unstable  relationships  with the economy  and inadequate 
controllability  and observability. 
Besides  the  question  of  stability  of  the  money-output  link,  another 
broad unresolved  issue  concerns  the degree  to which  successful  mone- 
tary policies  are the  result  of  a more  favorable  political  environment, 218 ?  BERNANKE  & MISHKIN 
Figure 1 GROWTH  RATES  OF NARROW  AND BROAD  MONETARY 
AGGREGATES 
Panel  A:  United  States 
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Figure 2 VARIABILITY  OF NARROW AND  BROAD MONEY GROWTH 
RATES 
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Figure  3 INTEREST  RATES  ON OVERNIGHT  BANK LOANS (RS)  AND ON 
LONG-TERM  BONDS (RL) 
Panel  A:  United  States  Panel  B:  United  Kingdom 
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Figure 4 VARIABILITY  OF CHANGES  IN SHORT- AND  LONG-TERM 
INTEREST RATES 
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Figure  5 INDICES  OF NOMINAL  EXCHANGE  RATES  (MARCH  1973 =  100) 
Panel  A:  United  States 
74'  '76'  '78'  '80'  '82'  '84'  '86'  '88'  90 
Panel  C:  Canada 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90 
Panel  E:  Switzerland 





74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90 
Panel  D:  Germany 
Panel  F:  Japan 
Shown  are indices  of  nominal  exchanges  rates,  March  1973  =  100,  with  an  increase  indicating  an 
appreciation.  For the  United  States  the exchange  rate is the Federal Reserve's  effective  exchange  rate 
index; for other countries  the value  of the currency in U.S.  dollars is used. 
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Figure 6 INFLATION RATES 
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Panel  B:  United  Kingdom 
74  76  78  80 







1.  J  s;. 
I  I  [  '  I  ;  T  *  I  .i  I  ?  I  I  .  .  . 
IC 
.  I  .  .  .  .  .  I  .  .  .  *  .  I  .  I  .  . 224 *  BERNANKE  & MISHKIN 
Figure 7 UNEMPLOYMENT  RATES 
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rather than  superior  policy  techniques.  To ask the  question  more con- 
cretely:  Is  the  superiority  of  German  or Swiss  monetary  policy  over, 
say, British policy really due to better and more coherent  policies by the 
Bundesbank  and  Swiss  National  Bank? Or is  the  better  German  and 
Swiss  performance  a  necessary  consequence  of  institutional  factors 
(such  as greater central bank  independence)  and  greater political  sup- 
port for low  inflation?  If the  latter is  true,  then  the  features  of  policy 
that we  have  observed  to be associated  with  more successful  outcomes 
may in fact be either  endogenous  or irrelevant. 
Despite  the  obvious  importance  of political  and institutional  factors, 
it  still  seems  plausible  that,  given  their  environments,  central  banks 
have  considerable  latitude  to deliver  successful  or unsuccessful  mone- 
tary policies.  Some evidence  for this proposition  is that the effectiveness 
of  monetary  policy  within  given  countries  has  changed  substantially 
over  time.  British  and  U.S.  monetary  policies  seem  noticeably  more 
successful  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  1970s.  Japan made  the  transition 
from  high  and  erratic inflation  in  the  mid-1970s  to  a low  and  stable 
inflation  rate (despite  the  fact that  the  Bank of Japan is probably  less 
politically independent  than,  say,  the Bank of Canada).  Political condi- 
tions (e.g.,  the public's  aversion  to inflation) can also change  over time, 
but  such  changes  are  likely  to  be  more  gradual  than  the  observed 
changes  in policy  outcomes.  Thus,  while  the political dimension  needs 
to  be  explored  further,  it  remains  likely  that  how  the  central  bank 
chooses  to  handle  monetary  policy  is  also  a major factor determining 
macroeconomic  outcomes. 
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This paper serves two useful  functions.  First, it may lay the foundations 
for interesting  future  research  on  the  effects  and  design  of  monetary 
policy.  Second,  it displays  both  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
what  used  to  be  called  history  but  is  now  called  the  "case  study  ap- 
proach."  Despite  these  contributions,  the  paper  is  a  difficult  one  to 
discuss.  Primarily this  is because  neither  sharp  hypotheses  are gener- 
ated nor is the  data used  to discriminate  between  alternative  theories, 
either positive  or normative. 
In this  comment  I discuss  three  issues:  (1) some  of  the  advantages 
and disadvantages  of the case  study  approach,  (2) the substance  of the 
paper's findings  regarding  the motivation  for central bankers' behavior, 
and (3) the  substance  of the paper's  policy  recommendations. 
According  to the authors,  "[A] more flatly empirical approach is taken 
by the present  paper.  We use  a simple  case study  methodology  to ana- 
lyze  the conduct  and  performance  of monetary  policy  in six industrial- 
ized  countries  for the  period  from the breakup  of Bretton Woods  until 
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the present"  pp.  2-3.  While  I'm not  exactly  sure why  case  studies  are 
more or less  "flatly empirical"  than  unconstrained  Vector Autoregres- 
sions (VAR's), it is useful  to think about some  of the pluses  and minuses 
of the proposed  methodology.  The pluses  are obvious.  I can't imagine 
anyone  arguing  that the only  source  of information  that is useful  to an 
economist  is the  CITIBANK data tape.  Surely  it's important  to under- 
stand  the  institutional  reality  and  the  political  environment  within 
which  economic  decisions  are reached. 
The issue  is what,  if any,  are the minuses  of the case study  approach. 
My  own  sense  is  that  the  single  biggest  problem  has  to  do  with  the 
problem  of  sample  selection  bias.  Of course,  if the  sample  selected  is 
defined to be the  population  of interest,  sample  selection  bias won't  be 
an issue.  If what  you're  interested  in is the history  of a particular coun- 
try over a particular time period,  then  that is what  you  ought  to study. 
But unless  this is the case,  sample  selection  bias is a potentially  impor- 
tant problem.  To pursue  this  idea  it is worth  defining  some  notation. 
Let Y denote  a vector  of outcomes  of interest  and let X denote  a vector 
of "control" or explanatory  variables.  Also  denote  the joint density  of 
Y and  X by f(x,y).  In  practice,  economists  are typically  interested  in 
objects like f(x,y)  or marginal density  functions  like f(y  x). The sample 
selection  issue  arises because  f(x,y)  and f(y  x) must be estimated  using 
a sample  of observations  on the y's and x's. 
The key  advantage  of random  sampling  rules  where  all individuals 
are  equally  likely  to  be  sampled  is  that  it  produces  a  description  of 
population  characteristics that becomes  increasingly  accurate as sample 
size  expands.  However  to the  extent  that we  are not  interested  in the 
population  distribution  of  x,  and  we  only  care about  the  conditional 
density  of y given  x, i.e.,  f(ylx),  then  certain types  of nonrandom  sam- 
pling rules can be justified.  Specifically,  it is well known  that if samples 
are selected  solely  on the basis of the x variables,  then inference  regard- 
ing f(y  x) won't  be affected.  Sample  selection  distorts inference  regard- 
ing f(y  x) only  if selection  occurs  on the basis of y, or y in conjunction 
with  x. 
Unfortunately  this  result  provides  very  little  solace  for macroecono- 
mists.  This is because,  to a first approximation,  no aggregate  variable is 
both exogenous  and  observable.  All that we  get to see  are current and 
lagged  Y's.  It is  simply  very  hard  to  think  of  plausible  candidate  X 
variables. Indeed  it's exactly the absence  of measurable  exogenous  vari- 
ables  that leads  macroeconomists  to  talk about  things  like  technology 
shocks,  animal  spirits,  and  seasonal  shocks  as the  driving  variables  in 
business  cycles.  It is also the  reason  that VAR analysts  spend  so much 
time worrying  about how  to decompose  innovation  covariance matrices 
into underlying  structural disturbances.  Exactly identified  VAR's, struc- 230  EICHENBAUM 
tural or otherwise,  are attempts  to impose  just  enough  restrictions  on 
the  relationships  between  endogenous  variables  to  find  dynamic  ana- 
logs  to the X's. 
Is it the  case  that  the  "case  study  methodology"  somehow  avoids 
these  problems?  The  answer  is  clearly no.  If, to a first approximation 
everything  is  endogenous,  sample  selection  inevitably  occurs  on  the 
basis of "dependent"  variables.  What this means  is that if case  studies 
are going to be useful,  we are going  to have to be explicit about articulat- 
ing the purpose  of these  studies  and the way  samples  are selected,  i.e., 
why  we  are studying  a particular time  period  or group  of countries.  If 
and when  this is done,  case studies  can be enormously  useful,  precisely 
because  the kind of information  they bring to bear on arguments  about 
what can and cannot be viewed  as exogenous  are often more compelling 
than running  regressions  on the usual  list of suspects  from CITIBANK. 
Indeed,  this,  I suspect,  is the reason  that the Romer and Romer (1989) 
study  of monetary  policy  shocks  in  the  postwar  United  States  has  re- 
ceived  so much  attention. 
How well  do Bernanke and Mishkin meet this challenge? In my view, 
not well  at all. Can we  think of the countries  included  in their study  as 
having  been  selected  on  the  basis  of  some  list  of  X's.  The  answer  is 
clearly no.  The  existence  of  inflation  in  the  countries  that  they  study 
can  hardly  be  viewed  as  exogenous.  The  fact  that  monetary  targets 
existed in these  countries,  and were  sometimes  even  paid lip service to, 
also cannot  be viewed  as exogenous  events  or plausible  candidates  for 
"controls." 
The only  statement  about their sample  selection  rule is contained  on 
page 187 where  the authors inform us that the six countries to be studied 
represent  "independent"  observations  in the sense  that, for most of the 
period, no two of them belonged  to a common  system  of fixed exchange 
rates.  Other countries  with  independent  policies,  such  as Sweden  and 
Australia, were excluded  because  of space and data limitations.  Perhaps 
even  more troubling  is the fact that no mention  whatsoever  is made  of 
the  countries  that  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1991) characterize  as being 
afflicted  by  moderate  inflations.  Perhaps  Bernanke  and  Mishkin  feel 
that there is nothing  in the experience  of those  countries  that is relevant 
to the  questions  being  asked  in  this  paper.  If so  they  ought  to tell us 
why.  I for one  find  it troubling  that  Dornbusch  and  Fischer managed 
to write  a whole  paper  on  moderate  inflation  and  analyze  eight  coun- 
tries in great detail without  once mentioning  monetary  targets.  In sharp 
contrast,  Bernanke  and  Mishkin  manage  to analyze  the  monetary  his- 
tory of six countries  over the postwar  era without  once mentioning  fiscal 
policy. Comment  *  231 
Even conditioning  on  Bernanke  and  Mishkin's  choice  of countries,  I 
do not know  what  to make of their decision  to study  six countries  over 
exactly  the  same  time  period,  when  many  were  subject  to  the  same 
disruptions  like the oil shocks  of 1973 and 1978. In what  sense  do these 
six countries  constitute  independent  observations?  Surely  no  one  be- 
lieves  that the  countries  happened  to experience  rises  in inflation  and 
recessions  over the  same  time period  by coincidence. 
Let me  now  turn to the  authors'  substantive  findings.  Consider  first 
their results  about  what  motivates  central bankers.  The  authors  reach 
three main conclusions:  (1) Central bankers have multiple  objectives; (2) 
the  greater is  the  central bank's  concern  about  inflation,  the  stronger 
will be its tendency  to employ  monetary  targets; and (3) central bankers 
never and nowhere  adhere to strict, ironclad rules for monetary  growth. 
As far as I can tell, the first claim is devoid  of empirical content  other 
than the proposed  list of variables  that central bankers  sometimes  care 
about. Granted it's useful  to be reminded  that the simple objective func- 
tions  attributed  to  monetary  authorities  in  theoretical  models  are,  at 
best,  useful  pedagogical  devices.  But surely  no one  thought  otherwise. 
For a  statement  like  (1) to  be  useful,  the  authors  need  to  argue  that 
some  representation  of bankers'  preferences  or decision  rules  that has 
been  adopted  in the literature has led us  seriously  astray. 
The  evidence  for  (2) is  that  "All  six  of  the  countries  here  adopted 
monetary  targeting  in the  1970s in response  to a worldwide  increase  in 
inflation  and  persisted  with  money  targets  until  disinflation  was 
achieved"  (see  p. 209). While  this may or may not be true in a broader 
sample  of  countries  and  time  periods,  I am  vague  on  exactly  what  is 
being  claimed.  Perhaps  what  the  authors  mean  is  that  central  banks 
actually take monetary  targeting  seriously  when  inflation  attains  some 
critical level.  If so,  the claim is certainly false as applied  to the post-war 
United States. While much controversy  surrounds  the conduct  of mone- 
tary policy  during  the period  1979 to 1982, one  thing  is perfectly  clear. 
The Federal Reserve Board was no more successful  in meeting  monetary 
targets  after  1979 than  before  1979.  Certainly  the  Fed  must  be  given 
credit for pursuing  restrictive  monetary  policy  action that made  the re- 
duction  in  inflation  between  1980 and  1982 possible.  But the  relevant 
question  here is what  role did monetary  targeting play in achieving  this 
reduction? 
To answer  this question  it is useful  to look at the Figure 1 taken from 
Broaddus  and  Goodfriend  (1984).  Notice  that  M1 overshot  the  upper 
bound  of the Fed's target ranges  in 1977 and  1978 and came within  the 
upper  third  of  its  range  in  1979.  After  renewing  its  commitment  to 
disinflationary  policy  in October  1979, the  Fed again  let M1 overshoot 232 *  EICHENBAUM 
Figure 1 ANNUAL TARGET  RANGES  FOR  M1 AND CORRESPONDING 
ACTUAL  Ml GROWTH,  1975-1985 
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its target in 1980, and the inflation  rate remained  high  throughout  that 
year.  Then,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  preceding  4  years,  effective  M1 
substantially  undershot  its range in 1981. 
To me  the  data suggests  that the  "discipline"  of monetary  targeting 
did not contribute  significantly  to the reduction  in inflation.  The reduc- 
tion was  due  to the  shock  of M1 significantly  undershooting  its target 
after a 4-year period  during  which  growth  either  exceeded  or came  in 
well in the upper end of the range. I conclude  that the issue  of monetary 
targeting in the United  States just isn't very interesting  from a positive 
point of view.  We never had it. What the Fed targeted in 1979 was  high 
nominal  interest  rates,  not  low  growth  rates of M1.  Surely  no  one  be- 
lieved  otherwise-now  or then. 
Finally,  I wish  to comment  on the  main normative  conclusion  of the 
paper,  that "Short run adherence  to money  growth  targets may not be 
necessary  for the  successful  use  of a money  targeting  strategy  as long 
as there is some  commitment  by the central bank to reverse  deviations 
of money  growth  from target over  the longer  term" (see  p.  215). Here 
Bernanke  and  Mishkin  are  implicitly  advocating  a  monetary  rule  ac- 
cording to which  the monetary  authority responds  to various exogenous 
shocks  that impact upon  the system,  but subject to the constraint  that, 
over some  (unspecified)  horizon  of time,  the actual growth  rate of some 
(unspecified)  monetary  variable equal its target rate. Comment  *  233 
Stated at this level of abstraction,  it's hard to disagree. After all, aside 
from the time consistency  issue,  there is little theoretical  reason  to rec- 
ommend  a k% rule. This class of rules is clearly suboptimal  in the pres- 
ence of nominal  wage  or price rigidities.  Nor would  it be optimal in the 
presence  of  the  types  of  frictions  in  financial  markets  emphasized  in 
recent work  by  Lucas  (1990), Fuerst  (1992), or Christiano  and  Eichen- 
baum  (1992).  One  needn't  be  a Keynesian  to  argue  that k% rules  are 
suboptimal. 
At the  same  time,  though,  it is worth  emphasizing  that the  types  of 
frictions  that  render  k% rules  suboptimal  do  not  argue  for discretion 
per se.  They  simply  argue  for complicated  rules.  The  problem  is  that 
even  if we  felt confident  that we  actually  knew  the  optimal  rule,  how 
could we  set up institutions  in ways  that would  ensure  that the mone- 
tary authority followed  the optimal rule and didn't revert to discretion- 
ary policy? 
Indeed,  this  is  the  question  that  the  time  consistency  literature has 
been  struggling  with  for years.  Presumably  what  is  attractive about  a 
k% rule  is  that  deviations  from  it are easy  to  spot.  In particular,  the 
probability of reverting  to discretionary  policy  is lowered  by moving  to 
relatively  simple  rules.  And  in  the  minds  of  some,  this  advantage  is 
sufficiently  important  to outweigh  the disadvantages  of not responding 
to the various  shocks  that impact  on modern  economies. 
In light  of  these  problems,  how  should  we  interpret  Bernanke  and 
Mishkin's  policy recommendation?  Their entire argument  consists  of an 
appeal  to the  historical  experience  of Switzerland  and,  to a somewhat 
lesser extent,  Germany and Japan. Implicit in their analysis is the notion 
that at least the Swiss  have  solved  the conundrum  facing the time con- 
sistency  literature.  Fine,  but  how?  Until  we  know  the  answers  to this 
question,  Bernanke  and  Mishkin's  advice  amounts  to  saying  that  we 
should  be like the  Swiss.  The real issue  is just how  should  we  change 
our institutions  so  that more  complicated  rules  could  be implemented 
in a way  that mitigates  the  time  consistency  problem.  Until  we  know 
the  answer  to  that  question,  we  will  not  have  made  much  progress 
regarding  the central issue  in the debate  about rules versus  discretion. 
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Comment 
JOHN B. TAYLOR 
Stanford  University  and  NBER 
Ben Bernanke  and  Rick Mishkin  have  put  together  a useful  data base 
on money  growth,  targets for money  growth,  and monetary policy deci- 
sions  in six different  countries  during  the  1970s and  1980s. The tables, 
charts, and narrative-based  on central bank reports and contemporary 
commentaries-have  great potential  to help  students  of monetary  eco- 
nomics  and monetary  policy  sort out macroeconomic  events  during this 
period. 
An  example  of this  potential  is Bernanke  and  Mishkin's  demonstra- 
tion  that money  growth  accelerated  in Japan and  Germany  in the late 
1980s, and  that in both  countries,  attempts  to stabilize  exchange  rates 
led to this acceleration.  This finding  deserves  careful analysis  by those 
interested  in the conduct  of monetary  policy.  According  to many macro- 
economic  theories,  these  increases  in  money  growth  should  have 
brought  about  an acceleration  of inflation  and  perhaps  another boom- 
bust  cycle.  In fact,  inflation  did  accelerate  in  the  late  1980s and  early 
1990s. Hence,  exchange  rate stabilization  in the  1980s could  be a cause 
for the deterioration  in macroeconomic  performance  in Japan and Ger- 
many in the early 1990s. A careful analysis  of the data could  determine 
whether  the timing,  magnitudes,  and absence  of other factors affecting 
inflation could establish  such a causal connection.  There are many other 
examples  offering  a wealth  of interesting  research projects. 
1. The  need  for a theoretical  framework 
Bernanke  and  Mishkin,  however,  do  more  than  simply  present  the 
facts. They use their data base to develop  positive and normative  "hypoth- 
eses."  They carefully distinguish  between  the two types  of hypotheses. 
The positive  hypotheses  are verbal descriptions  of the empirical regu- 
larities that they  observe  in the time series  data and in the central bank 
records. In general,  I have little disagreement  with their informal charac- 
terizations  of  the  data  in  these  positive  hypotheses.  I would  prefer, 
however,  that they use statistical methods  to establish these regularities, 
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rather than relying  solely  on  an "eyeball"  approach.  For example,  one 
of their positive  "hypotheses"  is that central banks tend to adopt money 
targeting when  inflation increases;  in other words,  Bernanke and Mish- 
kin argue  that there  is a time  series  correlation  between  the  strictness 
of  money  targeting-perhaps  measured  by  the  size  of  the  deviation 
between  money  growth  and  target-and  the  inflation  rate.  If so,  one 
should  be able to establish  this correlation for each of the countries with 
time series  methods. 
The  author's  normative  hypotheses  are  more  troublesome,  in  my 
view.  To be  sure,  Bernanke  and  Mishkin  are cautious  in emphasizing 
that their normative  hypotheses  are "not to be treated as conclusions," 
but  rather  as  "suggestive  propositions  that  are  advanced  for  further 
discussion,  analysis  and  testing."  Nevertheless,  the  development  of 
even preliminary hypotheses  from raw data requires a theoretical frame- 
work-a  model  that unfortunately  the authors  do not provide.  Without 
such a model,  I must admit I find it difficult to assess  the causal connec- 
tion between  their data and their hypotheses,  and thereby even  discuss 
the results. I do not mean to say a full-blown econometric model,  or even 
a set of equations,  is necessary  to establish  the plausibility  of such a con- 
nection.  Presumably  that would  come  in later research,  perhaps  along 
the lines being pursued  at the Brookings Institution  multicountry  model 
comparison  project.  But to establish  even  a preliminary  causal relation- 
ship,  it is necessary  to provide  at least  a few  words  on  such  things  as 
the relationship  between  money  growth,  inflation,  and real output.  By 
way  of  comparison,  in  an  earlier case  study  of  monetary  policy-the 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  monetary  history,  models  were  used  to make 
the connection  between  the facts and the policy  hypotheses. 
Bernanke  and  Mishkin  refer to  papers  by  Poole  as well  as Kydland 
and Prescott in their analysis.  Yet these  two papers use entirely different 
macroeconomic  frameworks-one  Keynesian  and the other new  classi- 
cal-which  have very different implications  concerning  the relationship 
between  money  growth  inflation  and real output. 
2. Definition  of policy  rules 
Bernanke and Mishkin  set the stage  for their analysis  with  a discussion 
of the rules versus  discretion  debate.  This is a good  place to begin,  but 
unfortunately  I disagree  with  their characterization  of policy  rules  and 
their distinction  between  rules and discretion.  Their definition  of a pol- 
icy  rule  includes  only  rules  with  fixed settings,  such  as  a k% rule  for 
money  growth.  They state,  e.g.,  that, "Monetary rules do not allow the 
monetary  authorities  to respond  to unforeseen  circumstances." 
If there  is  anything  we  have  learned  from  modern  macroeconomic 
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money  growth rules. Bernanke and Mishkin appear to relegate feedback 
rules  to  the  discretion  class.  Perhaps  it is  because  they  restrict them- 
selves  to  such  a  narrow  definition  of  policy  rules  that  they  feel  that 
previous  research on policy  rules has been  cast in "abstract and histori- 
cal terms."  Many  papers,  however,  have  explored  the  effectiveness  of 
feedback  policy  rules in practically oriented  empirical models  fit to his- 
torical data. In these  papers the monetary  authorities  do react to unfore- 
seen  circumstances.  Indeed,  the  "optimal"  policy  of  Kydland  and 
Prescott or the  "rules" solution  of Barro and Gordon in the time incon- 
sistency  literature can entail adjustment  of the instruments  in response 
to unanticipated  shocks. 
Eliminating  contingency  rules  from  consideration  makes  it  difficult 
for me  to interpret  their concept  of a hybrid  policy,  later in the paper. 
Is a hybrid policy  simply  a feedback  rule? Or does  it entail discretion  in 
the sense  of Kydland  and Prescott? 
3. Discussion  of the normative  hypotheses 
Bernanke and  Mishkin  observe  that monetary  policy  has been  run dif- 
ferently  in  the  six  countries  and  draw  their  "normative  hypotheses" 
from these  differences.  The first hypothesis  is that money  growth  tar- 
gets  are a useful  medium  term strategy  as long  as central banks do not 
"play games."  According  to the  authors,  the  countries  that have  most 
effectively  resisted  playing  games  are Germany  and Switzerland,  while 
the worst  have been  the United  States,  the United  Kingdom,  and Can- 
ada. Japan is an intermediate  case. 
Yet in terms of macroeconomic  performance-low  output  variability 
and  low  and  stable  inflation-Japan  would  be  ranked  first,  not  in the 
middle.  By some  measures  the  United  States  would  be  ranked  better 
than Germany: The recovery  from the  1981-1982  recession  was  faster, 
and  the  inflation  rate is  currently  lower.  Hence,  even  the  correlation 
between  central bank policy  and macroeconomic  performance  does  not 
correspond  with  this first normative  hypothesis. 
Their second  hypothesis  is that the  central bank  should  reverse  the 
direction of money  growth  if it deviates  from its target. Put differently, 
they argue that the central bank should  avoid base drift. The only hard 
evidence  in  favor  of  this  hypothesis  that  I could  find  in  the  paper  is 
Switzerland,  where  money  growth  overshot  in the late 1970s and then 
was  offset  by negative  money  growth  in the  early 1980s. On the  other 
hand,  research by Carl Walsh  (referred to in the paper) has shown  that 
whether  base drift is a good  policy depends  on the nature of the shocks. 
The third normative  hypothesis  is that central bank operating  proce- 
dures do not matter much.  I take this to mean that as long as the central 
bank  is  targeting  money,  it does  not  matter whether  interest  rates or Discussion 237 
reserves  are used  as the  means  of controlling  money.  Clearly this con- 
clusion  depends  on  the  regulatory  environment  and  the  stability  of 
money  demand.  It cannot  hold  generally.  Moreover,  the  hypothesis 
does not apply to monetary  policies where  money  targeting is not essen- 
tial. Clearly it makes  a big difference  how  responsive  the central bank's 
interest  rate targets  are to economic  conditions.  An  operating  strategy 
that focuses  on interest rates rather than reserves usually leads to slower 
movement  in interest  rates. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
When  the  editors  of this volume  asked  me  to comment  on this paper, 
they suggested  that it would  be nice if I could draw on my recent experi- 
ence in Washington  to give  a policy  perspective  to Bernanke and Mish- 
kin's  technial  analysis  of monetary  policy.  Having  read the  paper  and 
completed  my comments,  I find the roles of the paper writers and this 
discussant  to be the reverse  of the editors'  suggestion.  The researchers, 
Bernanke and Mishkin,  have  written  a paper that eschews  models  and 
technique,  which  endeavors  to go  directly to a policy-making  perspec- 
tive.  This discussant,  the former policymaker,  is crying out for a model 
and  techniques,  prior to  providing  policy  suggestions.  My  experience 
is that there are far too  many  policy  papers  in government  that do not 
pay  enough  attention  to  economic  models  and  theory.  Policy  papers 
with  explicit empirically  based  theories  are still a rare commodity.  Per- 
haps  future  research  can  make  use  of  the  useful  data base  Bernanke 
and Mishkin  have  assembled  to provide  the technical  analysis  that is I 
feel greatly needed  by policymakers. 
Discussion 
Bernanke responded  to the  Comment  by John Taylor that the  reversal 
of deviations  from monetary  targets would  be bad policy by noting  that 
monetary targets generally  reflect changes  in the underlying  state of the 
economy.  For example,  monetary  targets in Germany  and Switzerland 
depend  explicitly  on  predictions  of  velocity.  Reversals  of  deviations 
should,  of course,  take into account  changes  in the targets.  In response 
to the Comment  by Martin Eichenbaum  on  sample  selection  bias,  Ber- 
nanke explained  that the sample  was  chosen  simply based  on the avail- 
ability of data in the Federal Reserve  Bank's database. 
Catherine  Mann echoed  another  concern  expressed  in the Comment 
by Martin Eichenbaum  that the paper  draws  conclusions  while  lacking 
formality  and  an  underlying  theoretical  framework.  In response,  Ber- 
nanke  and Mishkin  each emphasized  that the point  of their case study 
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method  was  not  to write  down  a model,  set  up  formal tests,  and  use 
the  data to test  the  model  empirically.  Such  a formal process  assumes 
that the  hypothesis  to be  tested  is  known  ahead  of  time.  Rather,  the 
goal of this paper,  they  argued,  is to broaden  the base  of stylized  facts 
that economists  use  to develop  testable  hypotheses. 
Olivier  Blanchard  noted  that  the  observation  that  monetary  targets 
represent  signals  is  followed  by  the  informal  discussion  of  a positive 
model of Central Bank behavior  along the lines of the Kydland-Prescott 
model.  Blanchard asked  if such  a model  could  be  written  down  more 
formally. In response,  Bernanke suggested  that a model employing  rep- 
utation effects and recognizing  that both the Central Bank and the exec- 
utive branch of government  are players  could be developed  and would 
likely  fit well  with  the  stylized  facts documented  in the  paper.  David 
Wilcox wondered  whether  the evidence  in the paper could be useful  for 
determining  how  important  monetary  signals  are empirically. 
Robert Gordon argued that a key omission  from the paper is a discus- 
sion  of  the  response  of  output  to  monetary  policy.  As  an  example, 
Gordon  pointed  to two  episodes  in U.S.  experience:  the  1978-1979  pe- 
riod and the 1985-1986  period.  In both cases,  monetary  policy overshot 
its targets, according to Table 1 in the paper. However,  monetary  policy 
in the  first instance  was  arguably  unsuccessful  because  nominal  gross 
national  product  as well  as  money  overshot  any  reasonable  target.  In 
contrast,  monetary  policy  was  extremely  successful  during  1985 and 
1986 as  the  double-digit  growth  of  M1  prevented  the  economy  from 
slipping  into a recession.  In one instance  the overshooting  of the mone- 
tary target was  harmful,  and,  in the other instance,  the overshooting  of 
the monetary target was beneficial.  According  to Gordon, it is important 
to distinguish  between  these  outcomes  when  discussing  monetary  pol- 
icy in the context  of targets. 
Martin Baily suggested  that the  output-inflation  tradeoff is likely to 
depend  on the type  of policy  implemented  by the Central Bank and on 
the institutional  structure of the economy,  for example,  the presence  of 
strong  unions  in  the  United  Kingdom.  He  argued  that  distinguishing 
between  the  endogenous  effects  from  the  operating  procedure  of  the 
Central Bank and the exogenous  influences  of the institutional  structure 
is necessary  before we  can understand  the output-inflation  tradeoff. 
Christina Romer noted  that a key  distinction  between  the methodol- 
ogy in the seminal  case study  by Friedman and Schwartz and the meth- 
odology  in the current paper is that Friedman and Schwartz  used  their 
case study  as the historical test of a maintained  hypothesis.  After exam- 
ining the evidence  from six countries,  Bernanke and Mishkin now  seem 
to have developed  a working hypothesis,  and Romer suggested  that their 
case study  could  be redone  in the tradition of Friedman and Schwartz. 